Roosevelt as Foreign Policy Leader

Abstract

In the years since 1945, Franklin Roosevelt has come under sharp attack for his handling of foreign affairs. To be sure, historians generally agree that he was an architect of victory in World War II, but they find little to compliment beyond that: His response to the London Economic Conference of 1933; his neutrality and peace plans of the 1930s; his pre-Pearl Harbor dealings with Japan; and his wartime approach to China, France, and Russia have evoked complaints of superficiality and naivete. His cautious reactions to the Italian conquest of Ethiopia; the demise of the Spanish Republic; Japanese expansion in China; Nazi victories from 1938 to 1941, the destruction of Europe’s Jews; and apparent wartime opportunities for cementing ties with Russia, transforming China, ending colonialism, and establishing a truly effective world body have saddled him with a reputation for excessive timidity about world affairs. His indirection and guarded dealings with the public before Pearl Harbor and his secret wartime agreements have provoked charges of arbitrary leadership destructive to American democracy.

At the Hyde Park Conference, Robert Dallek consistently attempted to place the “hot button” issues of the Wagner-Rogers Bill, U.S. immigration laws, and the role of Breckinridge Long in the context of Roosevelt’s overall priorities and problems.

Henry Feingold challenged whether—even given the broader picture — Roosevelt did enough. At the same time, Feingold has written extensively on a theme he also struck at Hyde Park: the degree to which American Jewry’s efforts to save the Jews of Europe should be judged “insufficient.”

This chapter by Dallek and the subsequent one by Feingold expand on their arguments. (Italicized headnotes for this and other chapters are written by the editor.)