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Innovative Tools for Business Coalitions in B2B Applications pp 49–63Cite as

Game Theory: An Overview

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Abstract

The goal of this chapter is to give a brief overview about Game Theory and, specifically, about Game Theory concepts and tools. Due to the need of short explanations, all proofs will be omitted, and we will focus only on the intuition behind the reported results. The concepts described in this chapter are used to develop the coalition approaches proposed in this book. The results of the concepts and methodologies discussed in this chapter are integrated with negotiation and production planning activities in order to support the coalition activities.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Basilicata, DIFA, Via dell’Ateneo Lucano 10, 85100, Potenza, Italy

    Pierluigi Argoneto & Paolo Renna

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  1. Pierluigi Argoneto
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  2. Paolo Renna
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Correspondence to Paolo Renna .

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Argoneto, P., Renna, P. (2011). Game Theory: An Overview. In: Innovative Tools for Business Coalitions in B2B Applications. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-85729-707-5_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-85729-707-5_3

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-85729-706-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-0-85729-707-5

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