Skip to main content

Advertising and Price to Sustain The Brand Value in a Licensing Contract

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
  • 1757 Accesses

Part of the book series: Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games ((AISDG,volume 12))

Abstract

One of the reasons that induce a brand owner to issue a licensing contract is that of improving the value of his brand. In this paper, we look at a fashion licensing agreement where the licensee produces and sells a product in a complementary business. The value of a fashion brand is sustained by both the advertising efforts of the licensor and the licensee. We assume that demand is proportional to the brand value and decreases with the price. The licensor wants to maximize his revenue coming from the royalties and to minimize his advertising costs. Moreover, he does not want his brand to be devalued at the end of the selling season. On the other hand, the licensee plans her advertising campaign in order to invest in the brand value and maximize the sales revenue. The aim of this paper is to analyze the different strategies the licensor can adopt to sustain his brand. To this end, we determine the optimal advertising policies by solving a Stackelberg differential game, where the owner of the brand acts as the leader and the licensee as the follower. We determine the equilibrium policies of the two players assuming that advertising varies over time and price is constant. We also determine a minimum selling price which guarantees brand sustainability without advertising too much.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

References

  1. Aaker D.A.: Managing Brand Equity. The Free Press, New York (1991)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Amaldoss, W., Jain., S.: Pricing of conspicuous goods: a competitive analysis of social effects. J. Marketing Res. 42(1), 30–42 (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Binmore, K., Osborne, M.L., Rubinstein, A.: Noncooperative models of bargaining. In: Aumann, R.J., Hart, S. (eds.) Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. North-Holland, Amsterdam (1992)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Buratto, A., Zaccour, G.: Coordination of advertising strategies in a fashion licensing contract. J. Opt. Theory Appl. 142(1), 31–53 (2009)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  5. Caulkins, J.P., Feichtinger, G., Kort P., Hartl, R.F.: Brand image and brand dilution in the fashion industry. Automatica 42, 1363–1370 (2006)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  6. Caulkins, J.P., Hartl, R.F., Feichtinger, G.: Explaining fashion cycles: imitators chasing innovators in product space. J. Econ. Dyn. Control 31, 1535–1556 (2007)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  7. Chintagunta, P., Sigué, J.P.: Advertising strategies in a franchise system. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 198, 655-665 (2009)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  8. Dockner, E.J., Jørgensen, S., Van Long, N., Sorger, G.: Differential Games in Economics and Management Science. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2000)

    Book  MATH  Google Scholar 

  9. Jørgensen, S., Di Liddo, A.: Design imitation in the fashion industry. In: Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, vol. 9, pp. 569–586. Birkhauser, Boston (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  10. Jørgensen, S., Kort P., Zaccour, G.: Optimal pricing and advertising policies for an entertainment event. J. Econ. Dyn. Control 33, 583–596 (2009)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  11. Jørgensen, S., Zaccour, G.: Differential Games in Marketing. Kluwer Academic, Boston (2004)

    Book  Google Scholar 

  12. Keller, K.L.: Strategic Brand Management: Building, Measuring, and Managing Brand Equity, 3rd ed. Prentice-Hall, New York (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Leibenstein, H., Bandwagon, Snob, Veblen: Effects in the Theory of Consumers’ Demand. Quart. J. Econ. 64(2), 183–207 (1950)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Martín-Herrán, G., Sigué, S.P., Zaccour, G.: Strategic interactions in traditional franchise systems: Are franchisors always better off? Eur. J. Oper. Res. 213(3), 526–537 (2011)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  15. Martín-Herrán, G., Taboubi, S., Zaccour, G.: On yopia in a dynamic marketing channel. G-2006-37, GERAD (2006)

    Google Scholar 

  16. Nerlove, M., Arrow, K.J.: Optimal advertising policy under dynamic conditions. Economica 39(114), 129–142 (1962)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  17. Power, D., Hauge, A.: No man’s brand – brands, institutions, and fashion. Growth Change 39(1), 123–143 (2008)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  18. Raugust, K.: The Licensing Business Handbook, 8th Ed. EPM Communications, New York (2012)

    Google Scholar 

  19. White, E.P.: Licensing. A Strategy for Profits. KEW Licensing Press, Chapel Hill (1990)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Alessandra Buratto .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2013 Springer Science+Business Media New York

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Buratto, A. (2013). Advertising and Price to Sustain The Brand Value in a Licensing Contract. In: Cardaliaguet, P., Cressman, R. (eds) Advances in Dynamic Games. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, vol 12. Birkhäuser, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8355-9_19

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics