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Part of the book series: Cognition and Language: A Series in Psycholinguistics ((CALS))

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Abstract

Argument: Freedom differs from free will in that the former is defined in relation to rational decision and extrinsic compulsion, while the latter is a private experience centered on agency and choice independent of the rationality of one’s options. Agency is a relation across contents in the same or successive mental state(s). The relation is between self and image, including the body image. Privacy is essential for the exclusivity of foreknowledge, the ability of the agent to predict his or her acts and to recollect a prior intention.

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Notes

  1. P. Schilder, The Image and Appearance of the Human Body (New York: International Universities Press, 1950); Self and Process, 112, for discussion of the body as an intermediate object; S. Gallagher, “Body Image and Body Schema: A Conceptual Clarification,” Journal of Mind and Behavior 7(1986): 541–554, on the distinction of a deep or unconscious body schema and an explicit or conscious body image.

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  2. J. Kim, “The Nonreductionist’s Trouble with Mental Causation,” and J. Hornsby, “Agency and Causal Explanation,” in Mental Causation, ed. J. Heil and A. Mele (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993).

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  3. On some of the various meanings of privacy in the philosophical literature, see T. Sprigge, “The Privacy of Experience,” Mind 77(1969): 512–521.

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  4. See the discussion in J. R. Lucas, The Future (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).

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© 1996 Plenum Press, New York

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(1996). Privacy. In: Time, Will, and Mental Process. Cognition and Language: A Series in Psycholinguistics. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-585-34654-0_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-585-34654-0_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-306-45231-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-0-585-34654-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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