This chapter analyses the macroeconomic consequences of a “social pact” among the government, trade unions and employers’ associations aimed at keeping the growth in domestic wages and prices in line with the government’s inflation target in a country belonging to a monetary union. We demonstrate that an outward-looking social pact which targets union-wide inflation can lead employment at the competitive level and eliminating the inflationary (or deflationary) bias in the economy.
Key words: Employment, inflation, social pacts, EMU.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2008 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Cavallari, L. (2008). Are The Income Policy Agreements Of 1992-93 In Italy Still Valid?Towards A Theory For The Optimal Design Of The “Social Pact”In The European Monetary Union. In: Padovano, F., Ricciuti, R. (eds) Italian Institutional Reforms: A Public Choice Perspective. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-72141-5_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-72141-5_4
Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY
Print ISBN: 978-0-387-72140-8
Online ISBN: 978-0-387-72141-5
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)