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Notes
- 1.
Strictly speaking, \(M\) must be square-free to avoid the possibility of output \(S=M\), which is forbidden in the post-condition of the code. The output bound is treated later in this section.
- 2.
See Exercise 2 for the non-square-free case.
- 3.
In the next section we find that the probability of a subtraction is at most \(\frac{1}{2}\) and, by increasing \(R\), the probability can be made as close to 0 as desired.
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Walter, C.D. (2009). Leakage from Montgomery Multiplication. In: Koç, Ç.K. (eds) Cryptographic Engineering. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-71817-0_16
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