Corporations, Capitalists, and Campaign Finance

  • Val Burris
Part of the Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research book series (HSSR)

Financial contributions to political parties and candidates are an important source of political influence in many societies. This is, perhaps, nowhere more true than in the United States, where candidates' need to raise and spend vast sums of money is accentuated by a system of weak and decentralized parties, single-member-district elections, nomination by party primaries, limited public funding, and media intensive campaigns that emphasize image and personality over clear policy differences. Given the vast inequalities in wealth in the U.S., rich contributors — including wealthy capitalists and giant corporations — play a dominant role in campaign finance and, thereby, exercise disproportionate influence over politics and public policy (Clawson et al. 1998; Domhoff 2006; Mills 1956).


Campaign Contribution Campaign Finance Campaign Spending Political Contribution Roll Call Vote 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Val Burris
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of SociologyUniversity of OregonEugeneUSA

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