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Can Cooperative Intrusion Detectors Challenge the Base-Rate Fallacy?

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Malware Detection

Part of the book series: Advances in Information Security ((ADIS,volume 27))

Abstract

In recent years, researchers have focused on the ability of intrusion detection systems to resist evasion: techniques attackers use to bypass intrusion detectors and avoid detection. Researchers have developed successful evasion techniques either for network-based (e.g., [14], [191]) or host-based (e.g., [18],[20]) detectors.

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Christodorescu, M., Rubin, S. (2007). Can Cooperative Intrusion Detectors Challenge the Base-Rate Fallacy?. In: Christodorescu, M., Jha, S., Maughan, D., Song, D., Wang, C. (eds) Malware Detection. Advances in Information Security, vol 27. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-44599-1_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-44599-1_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-387-32720-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-0-387-44599-1

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