Abstract
Power analysis attacks work because the power consumption of cryptographic devices depends on intermediate values of the executed cryptographic algorithms. Therefore, the goal of countermeasures is to avoid or at least to reduce these dependencies. In case of hiding, this is done by breaking the link between the power consumption of the devices and the processed data values. Hence, cryptographic devices that are protected by hiding execute cryptographic algorithms in the same way as unprotected devices. In particular, they calculate the same intermediate values. Yet, the hiding countermeasures make it difficult for an attacker to find exploitable information in power traces.
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© 2007 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
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(2007). Hiding. In: Power Analysis Attacks. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-38162-6_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-38162-6_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-0-387-30857-9
Online ISBN: 978-0-387-38162-6
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)
