Abstract
The paper presents a study of n-person cooperative games without side payments in the case of vector payoffs of players. Recently, much attention has focused on problems with vector payoffs in the field of game theory, since multicriteria models can better apply to real-world situations. In the paper, solution concepts are formulated and analysed. A nucleolus concept is proposed which is invariant on affine transformation of criteria and coincides with the Schmeidler nucleolus in case of unicriteria games with payments and with Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in case of unicriteria bargaining problem.
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© 1996 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Kruś, L., Bronisz, P. (1996). Solution concepts in multicriteria cooperative games without side payments. In: Doležal, J., Fidler, J. (eds) System Modelling and Optimization. IFIP — The International Federation for Information Processing. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-34897-1_35
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-34897-1_35
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