Abstract
A well-known property of so-called “MDP processes”1 is monotonicity in terms of the utilities of the agents, due to the sharing among the latter of a “surplus” of numeraire generated at each point of their trajectories. In this paper, we focus our attention on the somewhat neglected question of how this sharing takes place, and we propose to use game-theoretic concepts and methods for answering it. A byproduct of this enquiry is the formulation of a “nontâtonnement” process that seems to be of independent interest.
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Tulkens, H., Zamir, S. (2006). Surplus-Sharing Local Games in Dynamic Exchange Processes. In: Chander, P., Drèze, J., Lovell, C.K., Mintz, J. (eds) Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-25534-7_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-25534-7_3
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