A B Formal Framework for Security Developments in the Domain of Smart Card Applications

  • Frédéric Dadeau
  • Marie-Laure Potet
  • Régis Tissot
Part of the IFIP – The International Federation for Information Processing book series (IFIPAICT, volume 278)

Abstract

We propose in this paper a formal framework based on the B method, that supports the development of secured smart card applications. Accordingly to the Common Criteria methodology, we focus on the formal definition and modelling of access control policies by means of dedicated B models expressing, on one hand, the access control rules, and, on the other hand, the dynamics of the system. These models are then weaved to produce a security kernel. From there, we propose a conformance relationship that aims at establishing whether a concrete representation of the system complies, at the security level, with the security kernel. This embraces both a well-defined notion of security conformance as well as traceability allowing to relate basic events appearing at the level of applications with abstract security policies. This approach is put in practice on an industrial case study in the context of the POSé project, involving both academic and industrial partners.

Key words

Access Control B Method Security Model Traceability Common Criteria Conformance Relation 

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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Frédéric Dadeau
    • 1
  • Marie-Laure Potet
    • 2
  • Régis Tissot
    • 1
  1. 1.Laboratoire d’Informatique de Franche-ComtéFrance
  2. 2.Laboratoire d’Informatique de Grenoble BP.Saint-Martin

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