Advertisement

Designing incentive packet relaying strategies for wireless ad hoc networks with game theory

  • Lu Yan
  • Stephen Hailes
Part of the IFIP – The International Federation for Information Processing book series (IFIPAICT, volume 264)

Abstract

In wireless ad hoc networks, nodes are both routers and terminals,and they have to cooperate to communicate. Cooperation at the network layer means routing (finding a path for a packet), and forwarding (relaying packets for others). However, because wireless nodes are usually constrained by limited power and computational resources, a selfish node may be unwilling to spend its resources in forwarding packets that are not of its direct interest, even though it expects other nodes to forward its packets to the destination. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic model to facilitate the study of the non-cooperative behaviors in wireless ad hoc networks and analyze incentive schemes to motivate cooperation among wireless ad hoc network nodes to achieve a mutually beneficial networking result.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Network Node Forwarding Packet Repeated Game Wireless Node 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. 1.
    L. Buttyan and J.-P. Hubaux, “Stimulating Cooperation in Self-organizing Mobile Ad Hoc Networks,” in ACM/Kluwer Mobile Networks and Applications, vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 579-592, Oct. 2003.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    T. Nadeem, S. Dashtinezhad, C. Liao, L. Iftode, “TrafficView: traffic data dissemination using car-to-car communication”, in ACM SIGMOBILE Mob. Comput. Commun. Rev., Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 6-19, July 2004.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. C.E Perkins, E. M. Belding-Royer, and Y. Sun, “Internet connectivity for ad hoc mobile networks”, in International Journal of Wireless Information Networks, April 2002.Google Scholar
  4. S. Kumar, A. Arora, T.H. Lai, “On the lifetime analysis of always-on wireless sensor network applications”, in Proc. IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad hoc and Sensor Systems, 2005.Google Scholar
  5. G. Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science, Vol. 162, No. 3859, pp. 1243-1248, December 1968.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. S. Marti, T. J. Giuli, K. Lai, and M. Baker, “Mitigating Routing Misbehavior in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks”, in Proc. ACM/IEEE International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking (Mobicom), Boston, August 2000.Google Scholar
  7. S. Buchegger and J.-Y. Le Boudec, “Performance analysis of the CONFIDANT protocol,” in Proc. International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking & Computing (MOBIHOC 2002), Lausanne, Switzerland, June 2002.Google Scholar
  8. X. Li, M.R. Lyu, J. Liu, “A trust model based routing protocol for secure ad hoc networks”, in Proc. IEEE Aerospace Conference, 2004.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    T. Ghosh, N. Pissinou, K. Makki, “Towards designing a trusted routing solution in mobile ad hoc networks”, in Mobile Networks and Applications, Volume 10, Issue 6, December 2005.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Q. He, D. Wu and P. Khosla, “SORI: A Secure and Objective Reputation-based Incentive Scheme for Ad hoc Networks,” in Proc. of IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC2004), Atlanta, GA, USA, March 2004.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    M. T. Refaei, V. Srivastava, L. DaSilva, and M. Eltoweissy, “A Reputation-based Mechanism for Isolating Selfish Nodes in Ad Hoc Networks,” in Proc. IEEE Second Annual International Conference on Mobile and Ubiquitous Systems: Networking and Services (MOBIQUITOUS 2005), San Diego, CA, July 2005.Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    D. Quercia, M. Lad, S. Hailes, L. Capra and S. Bhatti, “STRUDEL: Supporting Trust in the Dynamic Establishment of peering coalitions”, in Proc. of ACM Symposium on Applied Computing SAC 2006, Dijon, France, April 2006.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    L. Buttyan and J.-P. Hubaux, “Enforcing service availability in mobile ad-hoc wans”, in Proc. IEEE/ACM Workshop on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHOC), Boston, MA, 2000.Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    S. Zhong, J. Chen, and Y. R. Yang, “Sprite: A Simple, Cheat-Proof, Credit-Based System for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks,” in Proc. of IEEE Infocom 2003, San Francisco, CA, USA, April 2003.Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    B. Raghavan and A. C. Snoeren, “Priority forwarding in ad hoc networks with selfinterested parties”, in Proc. Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, Berkeley, CA, 2003.Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    L. Anderegg and S. Eidenbenz, “Ad hoc-VCG:A Truthful and Cost-Efficient Routing Protocol for Mobile Ad hoc Networks With Selfish Agents”, in Proc. ACM/IEEE International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking (Mobicom’03), San Diego, CA, 2003.Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    M. Peirce, “Multi-party Micropayments for Mobile Communications”, PhD Thesis, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland, Oct. 2000.Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    V. Srinivasan, P. Nuggehalli, C. F. Chiasserini, and R. R. Rao, “Cooperation in wireless ad hoc networks,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM 2003, San Francisco, CA, Mar./Apr. 2003.Google Scholar
  19. Z. Fang and B. Bensaou, “Fair bandwidth sharing algorithms based on game theory frameworks for wireless ad-hoc networks”, in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM 2004.Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    A. Patcha and J.-M. Park, “A Game Theoretic Formulation for Intrusion Detection in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks”, in International Journal of Network Security, Vol.2, No.2, Mar. 2006.Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    V. Srivastava, J. Neel, A. B. MacKenzie, R. Menon, L. A. DaSilva, J. E. Hicks, J. H. Reed, and R. P. Gilles, "Using game theory to analyze wireless ad hoc networks," in IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials, vol. 7, pp. 46-56, 2005.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. 22.
    P. K. Dutta, “Strategies and Games: Theory and Practice,” MIT Press, 1999.Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    G. J. Mailath and L. Samuelson, “Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships”, Oxford University Press, 2006.Google Scholar
  24. 24.
    M. S. Morgan, D. F. HendryNet, “The Foundations of Econometric Analysis”, Cambridge University Press, 1997.Google Scholar
  25. 25.
    B. Beaufils, J.-P. Delahaye and P. Mathieu, “Our Meeting With Gradual: A Good Strategy For The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma”, in Proc. the Fifth Int’l Workshop on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems, MIT Press, 1997.Google Scholar
  26. 26.
    R. Axelrod and W. D. Hamilton, “The evolution of cooperation”, Science, 211: 1390-1396, 1981.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. 27.
    R. Axelrod, “The evolution of cooperation”, New York, 1984.Google Scholar
  28. 28.
    L. A. DaSilva and V. Srivastava, “Node Participation in Ad-hoc and Peer-to-peer Networks: A Game-theoretic Formulation”, Workshop on Games and Emergent Behavior in Distributed Computing Environments, September 18, 2004, Birmingham, U.K.Google Scholar
  29. 29.
    F. Milan, J. J. Jarmillo, and R. Srikant, “Achieving Cooperation in Multihop Wireless Networks of Selfish Nodes”, Workshop on Game Theory for Networks, October 14, 2006, Pisa, Italy.Google Scholar
  30. 30.
    M.A. Nowak, A. Sasaki, C. Taylor, D. Fudenberg, “Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations”, Nature, 428: 646-650, 2004.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. 31.
    L. Yan, S. Hailes, L. Capra, “Analysis of packet relaying models and incentive strategies in wireless ad hoc networks with game theory”, in Proc. IEEE 22nd International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA’08), Okinawa, Japan, 2008.Google Scholar
  32. 32.
    L. Yan, S. Hailes, “Cooperative Packet Relaying Model for Wireless Ad hoc Networks”, in Proc. ACM International Workshop on Foundations of Wireless Ad Hoc and Sensor Networking and Computing (FOWANC’08), co-located with ACM MobiHoc’08, Hong Kong, China, 2008.Google Scholar
  33. 33.
    Z. Li, “Min-Cost Multicast of Selfish Information Flows”, in Proc. of the 26th Annual IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’07), Anchorage, Alaska, May 6-12, 2007.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lu Yan
    • 1
  • Stephen Hailes
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. of Computer ScienceUniversity College LondonLondonUK

Personalised recommendations