Welfare Economics and Public Choice

  • Timothy Besley


Welfare economics provides the basis for judging the achievements of markets and policy makers in allocating resources. Its most powerful conceptual tool is the utility possibility frontier. This defines the set of utility allocations that can be achieved in a society subject to the constraints of tastes and technologies. Any allocation on the frontier cannot be Pareto dominated and hence would satisfy a rather minimal condition for it to be socially desirable.


Public Choice American Economic Review Median Voter Social Welfare Function Pareto Frontier 
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© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

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  • Timothy Besley

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