Abstract
A term limit is a statutory or constitutional restriction on the number of terms that an individual is allowed to hold a particular elected office. The term limit may or may not be grandfathered. Full grandfathering allows officeholders at the time that term limits are enacted to be exempt from term limits, whereas limited grandfathering allows such officeholders to be treated as if they have previously served no terms. Some term limits allow an individual who is forced out of office by term limits to hold the same office again after a specified period of time has elapsed while many do not. In recent years there has been heated debate over the desirability of term limits.
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Bender, B. (2004). Term Limits 2. In: Rowley, C.K., Schneider, F. (eds) The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_198
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_198
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