The “rent” whose dissipation is the subject of this item is the rent derived by rent seeking, not the rent on buildings or farms, etc. This is a relatively recent category in economics, because the discovery of the whole phenomenon of rent seeking is recent (Tullock, 1967). Modern states devote a great deal in the way of resources to activities or expenditures that benefit only narrow groups. It is probable that although each of these activities benefits only a small and distinct group, there are so many of them and they are so widely distributed that almost everyone benefits from at least one, and pays for many others well in excess of any benefits received.
- Public Choice
- Bituminous Coal
- Regulatory Taking
- Rent Seek
- Rent Extraction
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.
Tullock, G. (1967). “The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies and theft.” Western Economic Journal, 5: 224–232.
Tullock, G. (1993). “Rent seeking,” The Shaftesbury Papers, No. 2. Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
© 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Tullock, G. (2004). Rent Dissipation. In: Rowley, C.K., Schneider, F. (eds) The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_177
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-8607-0
Online ISBN: 978-0-306-47828-4
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive