Abstract
It is widely thought that just as a market economy is an expression of economic freedom, so is a democratic polity an expression of political freedom. A market economy and a political democracy would thus seem to combine to form a constitution of liberty for a free society. In this respect, the renowned constitutional scholar Charles McIlwain once noted that “constitutional government is by definition limited government” (McIlwain, 1947, p. 21). Without some explanation as to how it is possible truly to limit government, however, this common formulation is perhaps more sentimental than realistic. The task of giving that sentiment some grounding in reality is a difficult one that raises some knotty issues regarding the institutional framework of a free society.
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Wagner, R.E., Harris, H.L. (2004). Parchment Versus Guns. In: Rowley, C.K., Schneider, F. (eds) The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_150
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_150
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