Conclusion

Abstract

When evaluating the first two decades of the democratic regime inaugurated in 1983 in Argentina, the specialist literature has been in almost complete agreement in pointing out the concentration of political power in the executive branch of government as one of its distinctive features. This has often been interpreted as a result of a combination of constitutional and historical factors, as well as of the critical circumstances in which the holders of the Presidency had to operate, especially towards the end of the 1980s. Most concerns on the institutional development of the regime have been raised by Carlos Menem’s experience in government, since terms such as uniteralismo, decisionismo, decretismo, presidential cesarism, hobbesian style, personalist style, among others, have been coined to express the strong propensity of his Presidency to centralize the adoption of decisions.¹ Likewise, it has been highlighted that the other side of this process of concentration of power has been the loss of autonomy and the pronounced reduction in the capacities of the other institutions of government, Congress and the judiciary.