Shame and World

  • Phil Hutchinson
Chapter

Abstract

In the foregoing chapters I have essayed various problems with a number of philosophical approaches to emotion. The scientistic approach, as advocated and exemplified by Paul Griffiths, rested upon a picture of language and meaning that distorted our understanding of ourselves. The theory advocated by Agamben faced structurally similar problems in being wedded to a theory of meaning, which was found to be too abstract. I found much of interest in the version of cognitivism in the philosophy of emotion, which I called reason-giving cognitivism. However, we saw that this faced some serious problems (cf. Chapter 3, Sections 2 and 3). In addition, I briefly turned my attention to a recent influential, neo-Jamesian attempt to overcome (reason-giving) cognitivism’s problems, in the work of Jesse Prinz. This too was found to have substantial problems. The problems faced by reason-giving cognitivism and by Prinz’s neo-Jamesian approach were traced to their guiding, though unacknowledged, picture of mind and world as externally related, the former being that which bestows meaning on the latter.

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Copyright information

© Phil Hutchinson 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Phil Hutchinson
    • 1
  1. 1.Manchester Metropolitan UniversityUK

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