For methodological reasons, I have started, in Chapter 1, with a presentation of Kant’s account of self, in particular the conditions of identity and selfchoice that seem to be required by moral accountability and the possibility of moral judgement. Structural similarities, as I have mentioned, are identified when Sartre’s objections to Kant turn out to rely on a mistaken reading of Kant and when it can be shown that Kant, too, argues against the claims Sartre objects to. Now that we have a fairly detailed view of what Kant says about identity and self-choice, we can move on to a consideration of the Sartrean objections and to an evaluation of their merits. This chapter will consider two objections, both of which target Kant’s account of self. Chapters 4 and 6 will continue the comparative discussion with particular emphasis on freedom and moral normativity.
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- 5.This is a feature Kathleen Wider identifies as distinct for Sartre position when compared with Descartes’s (1997: 14).Google Scholar
- 8.For a detailed analysis of these differences, including also those of lesser importance brought about by the Critique of Dialectical Reason, see Leo Fretz (1992).Google Scholar