In talking about methodology, in the Introduction I have argued that a comparative analysis of two philosophers, like Kant and Sartre, is best conducted by an investigation of the objections one formulates against the other. I have also anticipated then that the conclusion of this investigation will be that Sartre misinterprets Kant’s moral theory and some of his most important objections miss the point; however, we can only talk about misinterpretation against the background of an interpretation that we consider accurate. This chapter, therefore, has precisely the task of making clear the interpretation of Kant’s account of self with which I will be working. I will start with his view of identity and will continue with self-choice, both of which represent preconditions of moral accountability.
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- 2.Here, following Graham Bird, I assume that the versions of the Third Paralogism in the two editions of the Critique of Pure Reason are not significantly different. On Bird’s account, the reason why Kant rewrote the whole section on paralogisms has to do with the Fourth Paralogism (2006: 627).Google Scholar
- 3.See Graham Bird’s illuminating account of the differences between Kant’s and Descartes’s projects (2006: esp. 366–9).Google Scholar
- 8.‘Numerical identity’ is similarly explained by Dieter Henrich (1989).Google Scholar