Abstract
George C. Marshall, as is well known, secured his place as a preeminent American military leader during World War II, achieving recognition as the architect of U.S. victory over the Axis. During the cold war, he gained even greater national acclaim and international fame as a statesman, most importantly as a result of his leadership in proposing and securing congressional approval for the European Recovery Program. “Statesman as well as soldier,” biographer Mark A. Stoler writes, Marshall’s “character and accomplishments were so exceptional that he is placed in the company only of George Washington when historical parallels and superlatives are used.”1 In assessing this remarkable career, however, historians have devoted far less attention to examining Marshall’s role in trying to decide the fate of Korea as it emerged from Japanese colonial rule starting at the end of World War II and in the immediate postwar years. Marshall, in fact, was directly involved in decisions that led to the division of this Asian nation in August 1945 and descent into a brutal civil conflict, as well as military devastation in the Korean War.
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Notes
Mark A. Stoler, George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century (Boston, MA: Twayne Publishers, 1989), ix, 83, 129.
Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Statesman, 1945–1959 (New York: Viking Press, 1987), 1.
Hong Kyu Park, “From Pearl Harbor to Cairo: America’s Korea Diplomacy, 1941–1943,” Diplomatic History vol. 13, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 343–358.
Xiaoyuan Liu, “Sino-American Diplomacy over Korea during World War II,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations vol. 1, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 223–264.
Mark Paul, “Diplomacy Delayed: The Atomic Bomb and the Division of Korea, 1945,” Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943–1953, ed. Bruce Cumings (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1983), 169–193.
E. F. Cress to Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), May 31, 1945, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–1945), Sec. I, Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), RG 218, U.S. National Archives (NA); Herbert Feis, The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953), 288.
Joseph C. Grew and Walter Johnson eds., Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904–1945 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 1466–1468. During discussions with T. V. Soong on June 15, 1945, American leaders explained that the United States advocated rapid Soviet entry into the war against Japan and a trusteeship for Korea. George M. Elsey to Harry S. Truman and William D. Leahy, July 1, 1945, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations ofthe United States (FRUS), The Conference of Berlin, I (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1960), 309–310.
Herbert Feis, The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960), 164–165.
William D. Leahy, notes, June 18, 1945, Diaries 1945, Box 5, William D. Leahy papers, Library of Congress (LOC), Washington, DC; Feis, The Atomic Bomb, 11. Leahy disagreed with Marshall’s assessment. He insisted that Japan would surrender before an invasion of the home islands became necessary. William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), 384–385.
State Department policy paper, June 22, 1945, in U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1945, Vol. VI: The British Commonwealth-The Far East (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1969), 561–564.
W. Averell Harriman to James F. Byrnes, July 3, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VII, 914.
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 1, Year of Decisions (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955), 317.
Ibid.; Harriman to Truman, July 9, 1945, FRUS, The Conference of Berlin, I, 234. The Chinese had begun to express concern to the United States about Soviet intentions in Korea during May 1945.
See Dewitt C. Poolememorandum, May 20, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VII, 870–873.
Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Row, 1947), 637.
See also John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins ofthe Cold War, 1941–1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 244–245
Barton J. Bernstein, “American Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Cold War,” Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration, ed. Barton J. Bernstein (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 32.
See also Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New York, NJ: Vintage Books, 1967), 103–106, 111–113 and Bernstein, “American Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Cold War,” 35.
Henry L. Stimson, diary entry, July 23, 1945, FRUS, The Conference of Berlin, II, 260n.
Combined Chiefs of Staff report, July 23, 1945, and Tripartite Military meeting minutes, July 24, 1945, FRUS, The Conference of Berlin, II, 345–353, 1462–1469.
See also Feis, The Atomic Bomb, 89–90 and Carl Berger, The Korean Knot: A Military-Political History (Philadelphia, PA: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), 42. Mark Stoler reports that Marshall told Stimson the atomic bomb reduced the value of Soviet assistance in the Pacific War. Stoler, George C. Marshall, 141. Gregory Henderson stresses the crucial importance of the Allied military meeting of July 24, 1945. He argues that Marshall’s comments indicated an American lack of serious interest in Korea and encouraged the Soviets to attempt the unilateral military occupation of the peninsula. See Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 121.
James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972), 7.
Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1960), 2–3.
Soviet-American Chiefs of Staff meeting minutes, July 26, 1945, FRUS, The Conference of Berlin, II, 410–415.
See also U.S. Department of State, “A Historical Summary of United States-Korea Relations, 1834–1962,” Far Eastern Series #175 (November 1962), 60.
Soviet draft proposal on trusteeship, n.d., and Council of Foreign Ministers meeting, August 1, 1945, FRUS, The Conference of Berlin, II, 550–551, 1594–1595.
James V. Forrestalmemorandum, July 28, 1945, in The Forrestal Diaries, ed. Walter Millis (New York: Viking Press, 1951), 78.
Herbert Feis, Contest Over Japan (New York: Norton, 1967), 9.
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) meeting, August 11, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VI, 634–637.
J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 25.
U.S. Department of State, “United States Policy in the Korean Crisis,” Far Eastern Series #34 (July 1950), ix.
JCS memorandum, 14 August 1945, FRUS, 1945, VI, 657–658.
Joseph Stalin to Truman, 12 and 16 August 1945, FRUS, 1945, VI, 634, 667–668.
Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938–1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 287–305.
James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941–1950 (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 80–98.
Memorandum of the Special Inter-Departmental Committee, February 25, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. VI: The Far East (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972), 609–618.
Robert P. Patterson to Hodge, February 24, 1947, John R. Hodge, General Correspondence, 1945–1947, Box 20, Robert P. Patterson papers, LOC; U.S. Congress, Senate, Joint Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East, III, 81st Congress, 1st Session, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1951), 2008.
Harry S. Truman,” Recommendations on Greece and Turkey,” DSB 16 (March 23, 1947), 536.
Harry S. Truman, “The President’s News Conference of April 3, 1947,” Public Papers of the President, Harry S. Truman, III (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1962), 191.
David Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1949), 302.
Soon-sung Cho, Korea in World Politics 1940–1950: An Evaluation of American Responsibility (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967), 158.
Vyascheslav Molotov to Marshall, April 19, 1947, FRUS, 1947, VI, 633–634.
Marshall to Molotov, May 2, 1947, FRUS, 1947, VI, 638–639.
James V. Forrestalmemorandum, May 7, 1947, in Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, 273.
George C. Marshall, “Hope Expressed for Early Provisional Government for Korea,” DSB 16 (June 22, 1947), 1249.
Hodge to Marshall, June 19, 1947, FRUS, 1947, VI, 675.
John M. Allison memorandum, July 29, 1947, FRUS, 1947, VI, 734–741.
Jacobs to Marshall, August 14 and 19, 1947, FRUS, 1947, VI, 753–754, 756–757.
Robert A. Lovett to Smith, August 21, 1947, FRUS, 1947, VI, 771–774; “Letter from the Acting Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Minister,” DSB 17 (September 7, 1947), 473–475.
Molotov to Marshall, September 4, 1947, FRUS, 1947, VI, 779–781; “Korean Questions to Be Referred to General Assembly,” DSB 17 (September 28, 1947), 623–624.
Francis B. Stevens memorandum, September 9, 1947, FRUS, 1947, VI, 784–785.
Forrestal to Marshall, September 26, 1947, Korean Documents, Box 10, Lloyd papers; JCS to SWNCC, September 26, 1947, FRUS, 1947, VI, 817–818.
George C. Marshall, “A Program for a More Effective United Nations,” DSB 17 (September 28, 1947), 619–620; New York Times, September 18, 1947, 8, 24.
Warren R. Austin to Trygve Lie, October 17, 1947, FRUS, 1947, VI, 832–835.
Warren R. Austin, “The Problem of the Independence of Korea,” DSB 17 (October 26, 1947), 820–822; New York Times, October 18, 1947, 14.
Austin to Marshall, November 14, 1947, FRUS, 1947, VI, 857–859.
Political Planning Staff report, November 6, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. I: General: The United Nations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1973), 770–777.
Sidney Souers to Truman, April 2, 1948, FRUS, 1948, Vol. VI: The Far East and Australasia (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1974), 1163–1169; “Chronology of Action by the National Security Council,” George M. Elsey papers, HSTL; Pogue, George C. Marshall: Statesman, 446.
D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, vol. 3, Triumph and Disaster, 1945–1963 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), 403.
Steven Casey, Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion, 1950–1953 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 86.
Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: Norton, 1969), 451. Pogue argues that the JCS also believed that a military commander should have the freedom to pursue a fleeing enemy, as well as finding justification for crossing the parallel in previous United Nations resolutions. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Statesman, 455.
James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1951–1953, vol. 3, The Korean War (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1988), 222–224.
Martin Lichterman, “To the Yalu and Back,” American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies, ed. Harold Stein (Birmingham, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1963), 584–585.
Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The General and the President and the Future of American Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1951), 150.
Harry S. Truman, “The President’s News Conference of September 21, 1950,” Public Papers, Truman, VI (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1964), 644.
Michael Schaller, Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 225.
Roger Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War,” International Security 13 (Winter 1988/1989): 50–89.
See also Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).
JCS to Ridgway, May 31, 1951, FRUS, 1951, Vol. VII: Korea and China (Washington, DC, 1983), 487–493.
William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 204–209.
Rosemary Foot, Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 36–37.
Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (New York: Knopf, 1986), 193.
Robert Leckie, Conflict: The History of the Korean War, 1950–1953 (New York: Putnam, 1962), 304.
Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1966), 20–22.
For recent examples, see Stanley Sandler, The Korean War: No Victors, No Vanquished (Lexington, VA: The University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 240.
Donald W. Boose, Jr., “The Korean War Truce Talks: A Study in Conflict Termination,” Parameters vol. 30, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 106.
Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 198.
William H. Vatcher, Panmunjom: The Story ofthe Korean Military Armistice Negotiations (New York: Praeger, 1958), 47.
Ridgway to JCS, July 28, 1951, FRUS, 1951, 7, 749–753.
Callum MacDonald, Korea: The War Before Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 103, 120.
Ridgway to JCS, August 10 and 11, 1951, FRUS, 1951, 7, 799–810.
Sidney D. Bailey, The Korean Armistice (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 78.
Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story ofthe War (New York: Times Books, 1982), 568.
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© 2011 Charles F. Brower
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Matray, J.I. (2011). Fighting the Problem: George C. Marshall and Korea. In: Brower, C.F. (eds) George C. Marshall. The World of the Roosevelts. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-11928-4_7
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