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Towards a German Supply Chain Act? Comments from a Choice of Law and a Comparative Perspective

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European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2020

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EUROYEAR,volume 11))

Abstract

The protection of human rights in global supply chains has become one of the most hotly debated issues in public and private (international) law. In a number of countries, including the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands, these debates have led to the introduction of domestic human rights legislation. In other countries reform plans are under way. In Germany, for example, the federal government recently announced plans to adopt a German Supply Chain Act, which, if passed as suggested, will introduce both mandatory human rights due diligence obligations and mandatory corporate liability provisions. The following article takes this announcement as an opportunity to look at the idea of a German Supply Chain Act from both a choice of law and from a comparative perspective. It argues that that any such Act will necessarily be limited in both its spatial and in its substantive reach and, therefore, recommends that Germany refrains from passing national legislation—and supports the adoption of a European instrument instead.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See https://www.business-humanrights.org/de and https://www.ecchr.eu.

  2. 2.

    See https://www.business-humanrights.org/de and https://www.ecchr.eu.

  3. 3.

    See, for example, Dowling (2020), pp. 219 ff.; Palombo (2019), pp. 267 ff.; Wagner (2016), pp. 757 ff.

  4. 4.

    In many countries, however, it is discussed whether and how the legal entity principle may be overcome to better protect human rights in global supply chains. See, for example Dowling (2020), pp. 228 ff; Weller and Thomale (2017), pp. 509 ff.

  5. 5.

    See for an overview of existing and planned legislation British Institute of International and Comparative Law et al. (2020), Final Report, pp. 192 ff. and Part III (Country Reports), Littenberg and Binder (2019); Marx et al. (2019), pp. 132 f.

  6. 6.

    See the press release available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/mex_20_323.

  7. 7.

    Human Rights Council, Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev. 1 (20. Juni 2014), abrufbar unter https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G14/058/99/PDF/G1405899.pdf?OpenElement. See De Schutter (2015), pp. 41 ff.

  8. 8.

    Since its inception the Working Group has published three drafts, the most recent in August 2020. Second Revised Draft of 6 August 2020 “Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises”, available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session6/OEIGWG_Chair-Rapporteur_second_revised_draft_LBI_on_TNCs_and_OBEs_with_respect_to_Human_Rights.pdf. Previous drafts date from 2018 and 2019 and are available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session3/DraftLBI.pdf and https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/OEIGWG_RevisedDraft_LBI.pdf.

  9. 9.

    UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights, pp. 13 ff., Principles No 11-24.

  10. 10.

    UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights, p. 1 (“Nothing in these Guiding Principles should be read as creating new international law obligations …”).

  11. 11.

    See for an overview the list available at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx.

  12. 12.

    National Action Plan for Business and Human Rights. Implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 2016–2020, English version available at https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/610714/fb740510e8c2fa83dc507afad0b2d7ad/nap-wirtschaft-menschenrechte-engl-data.pdf.

  13. 13.

    Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa. Eine neue Dynamik für Deutschland. Ein neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land—Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD, 19. Legislaturperiode (2018), p. 156, para. 7382 ff.

  14. 14.

    National Action Plan for Business and Human Rights (note 12), p. 10.

  15. 15.

    Monitoring of the status of implemention of the human rights due diligence obligations of enterprises set out in the National Action Plan for Business and Human Rights 2016–2020, Final Report (2020), p. 5, English version available at https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2417212/9c8158fe4c737426fa4d7217436accc7/201013-nap-monitoring-abschlussbericht-data.pdf.

  16. 16.

    Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten eines Mantelgesetzes zur nachhaltigen Gestaltung globaler Wertschöpfungsketten und zur Änderung wirtschaftsrechtlicher Vorschriften (Nachhaltige Wertschöpfungskettengesetz—NaWKG) einschließlich eines Stammgesetzes zur Regelung menschenrechtlicher und umweltbezogener Sorgfaltspflichten in globalen Wertschöpfungsketten (Sorgfaltspflichtengesetz—SorgfaltspflichtenG), Draft of 1 February 2019 (on file with the author). See for a first appraisal Weller and Nasse (2020), pp. 120 ff.

  17. 17.

    Entwurf für Eckpunkte eines Bundesgesetzes über die Stärkung der unternehmerischen Sorgfaltspflichten zur Vermeidung von Menschenrechtsverletzungen in globalen Wertschöpfungsketten (Sorgfaltspflichtengesetz), Draft of 10 March 2020 (on file with the author).

  18. 18.

    Klinger et al. (2016).

  19. 19.

    Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (“Rome II”) OJ 2007 L 199/40.

  20. 20.

    Weller and Nasse (2020), pp. 131 ff. See also Mansel (2018), pp. 454 ff. Wagner (2016), pp. 739 ff.; Weller and Thomale (2017), pp. 523 f. A detailed discussion of characterization matters is offered by Wendelstein (2019), pp. 124 ff.

  21. 21.

    See—with regard to German private international law—Mansel (2018), pp. 452 f.

  22. 22.

    See, for example, Dickinson (2017), p. 1564.

  23. 23.

    Enneking (2017), p. 49, note 33; Halfmeier (2015), p. 490, para 1 ff.; Kessedijan (2018), pp. 148 f.; Rühl (2020a), p. 97; Symeonides (2008), p. 174; Van den Eeckhout (2012), p. 188; Van den Eeckhout (2017), p. 49.

  24. 24.

    Case C-412/10, Homawoo, ECLI:EU:C:2011:747, para. 37; Dickinson (2017), p. 1563.

  25. 25.

    Enneking (2017), p. 52; Kessedijan (2018), p. 149. In a similar vein Habersack and Ehrl (2019), pp. 189 f.; Thomale and Hübner (2017), p. 392 pointing to “reasons rooted in game theory and behavioural economics”. An implicit (partial) choice of German law was discussed—and rejected by both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal in the KiK case. See LG Dortmund, Judgment of 10 January 2019, ECLI:DE:LGDO:2019:0110.7O95.15.00, para. 42; OLG Hamm, Decision of 21 May 2019, ECLI:DE:OLGHAM:2019:0521.9U44.19.00, para. 16 ff.

  26. 26.

    Recital 6. See for a critical appraisal Symeonides (2008), pp. 179 ff.

  27. 27.

    See, for example, Dickinson (2017), p. 1567; von Hein (2015a), p. 497, para. 5 and pp. 503 ff., para. 13 ff.; Symeonides (2008), p. 179.

  28. 28.

    Enneking (2008), p. 300; Enneking (2009), p. 928; Enneking (2017), p. 50; Halfmeier (2018), p. 41; Kessedijan (2018), p. 149; Van Calster (2014), p. 130; Lehmann and Eichel (2019), p. 96; Rühl (2020a), pp. 97 f.; Van den Eeckhout (2012), pp. 189 f.; Van den Eeckhout (2017), pp. 50 f.; Wagner (2016), p. 744.

  29. 29.

    See for a detailed discussion Enneking (2008), pp. 302 ff.; Enneking (2009), pp. 928 f.; Enneking (2017), pp. 52 ff.; Hartmann (2018), pp. 300 f.; Lehmann and Eichel (2019), pp. 93 ff.; Mansel (2018), pp. 459 ff.; Otero Carcá-Castrillón (2011), pp. 565 ff.; Wagner (2016), pp. 743 f.

  30. 30.

    Demeyere (2015), pp. 388 f.; Enneking (2008), pp. 302 f.; Enneking (2009), p. 928; Enneking (2017), p. 53; Habersack and Ehrl (2019), pp. 188 f.; Kessedijan (2018), p. 149; Otero Carcá-Castrillón (2011), pp. 571 f.; Van den Eeckhout (2012), p. 191; Van den Eeckhout (2017), p. 53. In a similar vein Van Calster (2014), p. 131; Hartmann (2018), pp. 300 f.; Mansel (2018), pp. 462 f.

  31. 31.

    Wagner (2016), pp. 744 f.

  32. 32.

    Generally von Hein (2015b), p. 615, para. 18.

  33. 33.

    Thomale and Hübner (2017), pp. 391 f.; Weller and Thomale (2017), p. 524. In a similar vein Heinen (2018), pp. 93 and 94; Van den Eeckhout (2012), pp. 190 f.; Van den Eeckhout (2017), p. 52 and—with regard to the French Loi de vigilance—Hoffberger (2017), p. 482.

  34. 34.

    Enneking (2008), pp. 300 f.; Enneking (2017), pp. 51 f.; Habersack and Ehrl (2019), p. 185; Halfmeier (2018), p. 42; Stürner (2014), pp. 370 f.; Stürner (2015), p. 851; Van Calster (2014), p. 130; Van Dam (2011), p. 231. In a similar vein LG Dortmund, 10 January 2019, Az. 7–O 95/15, ECLI:DE:LGDO:2019:0110.7O95.15.00, para. 43; OLG Hamm, 21 May 2019, Az. 9 U 44/19, ECLI:DE:OLGHAM:2019:0521.9U44.19.00, para. 25.

  35. 35.

    Thomale and Hübner (2017), pp. 391 f.; Weller and Thomale (2017), p. 524.

  36. 36.

    Weller and Thomale (2017), p. 525.

  37. 37.

    Thomale and Hübner (2017), pp. 391 f.; Weller and Thomale (2017), p. 524.

  38. 38.

    Mansel (2018), pp. 457 f.; Wendelstein (2019), pp. 141 ff. In a similar vein Habersack and Ehrl (2019), pp. 184 f.

  39. 39.

    European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (“Rome II”), COM(2003)0427—C5-0338/2003—2003/0168(COD) of 6 July 005, P6_TA(2005)0284. See for a detailed discussion von Hein (2008a), pp. 560 ff.; von Hein (2008b), pp. 1685 f.; von Hein (2009) p. 18.

  40. 40.

    See for a detailed discussion Enneking (2017), pp. 51 f.; Fulli-Lemaire (2019), p. 251; Halfmeier (2018), p. 42; Mansel (2018), pp. 455 ff.; Pförtner (2018), pp. 324 f.; Stürner (2015), pp. 850 f.; Van den Eeckhout (2012), pp. 190 f.; Wagner (2016), pp. 740 f; Weller et al. (2016), pp. 393 f.; Wendelstein (2019), pp. 141 ff.

  41. 41.

    Habersack and Ehrl (2019), p. 185; Halfmeier (2018), p. 41; Garcimartín Alférez (2007), p. I-84 and p. 566; Mansel (2018), p. 456; Pförtner (2018), pp. 324 f.; Rühl (2020a), pp. 101 ff.; Stone (2015), p. 303; Stürner (2015), p. 850. In a similar vein Enneking (2008), pp. 301 f., Enneking (2017), pp. 51 f. and—with regard to the French Loi de vigilance—Palombo (2019), p. 280.

  42. 42.

    See, for example, Enneking (2009), p. 930; Grabosch (2013), pp. 88 ff.; Van den Eeckhout (2012), pp. 179 and 191; Van den Eeckhout (2017), p. 53. Equally—with regard to the French Loi de vigilance—d’Avout (2017), p. 2062.

  43. 43.

    Enneking (2017), p. 59; Rühl (2020a), p. 103; von Hein (2015d), p. 743, para. 3.

  44. 44.

    Enneking (2017), p. 59; Halfmeier (2018), pp. 42 f.; Pförtner (2018), pp. 326 f.; Rühl (2020a), p. 103; Mansel (2018), pp. 465 ff.; Wagner (2016), pp. 742 f.; Wendelstein (2019), pp. 143 f. See also Van Hoek (2008), p. 166.

  45. 45.

    Enneking (2017), p. 59; Halfmeier (2018), pp. 42 f.; Pförtner (2018), pp. 326 f.; Rühl (2020a), p. 103; Mansel (2018), pp. 465 ff.; Wagner (2016), pp. 742 f.; Wendelstein (2019), pp. 143 f. See also Van Hoek (2008), p. 166.

  46. 46.

    Enneking (2017), p. 59; Halfmeier (2018), pp. 42 f.; Pförtner (2018), pp. 326 f.; Rühl (2020a), p. 103; Mansel (2018), pp. 465 ff.; Wagner (2016), pp. 742 f.; Wendelstein (2019), pp. 143 f.; von Hein (2015d), p. 742, para. 2. See also Van Hoek (2008), p. 166.

  47. 47.

    § 15 reads: “In the context of non-contractual liability claims, the obligations under §§ 4 to 10 govern the due diligence requirements to be observed, without regard to the law applicable to the non-contractual obligation under private international law.”

  48. 48.

    Entwurf für Eckpunkte eines Sorgfaltspflichtengesetz (note 17), p. 4, at 3. b).

  49. 49.

    Recital 7 calls for consistent interpretation of the Rome I and II Regulations.

  50. 50.

    Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable too contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ L 177/6.

  51. 51.

    Case C-149/18 Da Silva Martins, ECLI:EU:C:2019:84, para. 27 ff.

  52. 52.

    Case C-184/12 Unamar, ECLI:EU:C:2013:663, para. 41 ff.; CJEU, case C-149/18, Da Silva Martins, ECLI:EU:C:2019:84, para. 30 f.

  53. 53.

    Case C-184/12 Unamar, ECLI:EU:C:2013:663, para. 46.

  54. 54.

    See for details Arif (2011), p. 117; von Hein (2015c), pp. 734 ff., para. 11.

  55. 55.

    See, for example, Arif (2011), p. 117; Mankowski (2019), pp. 418 f., para. 562; Wagner (2008), p. 15.

  56. 56.

    See, for example, Garcimartín Alférez (2007), p. I-90; Leible and Lehmann (2007), p. 726; von Hein (2015c), p. 740, para. 21.

  57. 57.

    Case C-135/15 Nikiforidis, ECLI:EU:C:2016:774.

  58. 58.

    Ibid para. 55.

  59. 59.

    See for an overview British Institute of International and Comparative Law et al. (2020), Final Report, pp. 192. ff. and Part III (Country Reports); Littenberg and Binder (2019); Marx et al. (2019), pp. 132 f. (Annex 2).

  60. 60.

    Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups, OJ 2014 L 330/1.

  61. 61.

    Modern Slavery Act 2015, ch. 30.

  62. 62.

    Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas, OJ 2017 L 330/1. See Fleischer and Hahn (2018), p. 400; Habersack and Ehrl (2019), pp. 178 f.

  63. 63.

    Wet van 24 oktober 2019 houdende de invoering van een zorgplicht ter voorkoming van de levering van goederen en diensten die met behulp van kinderarbeid tot stand zijn gekomen, Staatsblad 2019, 401. An unofficial English translation is available at https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/2019/06/Dutch-Child-Labor-Due-Diligence-Act-Approved-by-Senate-Implications-for-Global-Companies.

  64. 64.

    Loi No. 399/2017 du 23 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre, JO du 28 mars 2017.

  65. 65.

    See for a very good overview the information and documents prepared by the Swiss Federal Agency of Justice (Bundesamt für Justiz), available at https://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/de/home/wirtschaft/gesetzgebung/konzernverantwortungsinitiative.html.

  66. 66.

    See the press release of the Swiss Government of 1 July 2020, available at https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen/bundesrat.msg-id-79692.html.

  67. 67.

    See for a (more) detailed discussion of the proposal Bueno (2020), pp. 239 ff.; Bohrer (2018), pp. 195 ff.; Handschin (2017), pp. 1000 ff.; Kaufmann (2016), pp. 45 ff.; Palombo (2019), pp. 277 f.; Werro (2019), pp. 166 ff.

  68. 68.

    See the preliminary results available at https://www.bk.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/20201129/index.html.

  69. 69.

    See also the press release of the Swiss Parliament of 9 June 2020, available at https://www.parlament.ch/de/services/news/Seiten/2020/20200609090519598194158159041_bsd048.aspx.

  70. 70.

    A concise comparison of the original proposal submitted by the Responsible Business Initiative and the counter-proposal of the Swiss Parliament is available at https://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/de/home/wirtschaft/gesetzgebung/konzernverantwortungsinitiative.html.

  71. 71.

    More detailed information available at https://www.business-humanrights.org/de und https://www.ecchr.eu.

  72. 72.

    See for details Petitjean (2019) as well as Conseil général de l’économie (2020), pp. 12 ff.

  73. 73.

    The full French text is available at www.legifrance.gouv.fr. An unofficial English translated can be found at https://corporatejustice.org/documents/publications/ngo-translation-french-corporate-duty-of-vigilance-law.pdf.

  74. 74.

    Rühl (2020b), pp. 1420 f.; Mansel (2018), p. 445; Nasse (2019), pp. 798 f. See, however, d’Avout (2017), p. 2061 who argues that only the liability rule of Article L. 225-102-5 CCom can be classified as tortious, while he assumes that the obligation to establish, publish and implement a vigilance plan embodied in Article 225-102-4 CCom belongs to company law.

  75. 75.

    Kessedijan (2018), p. 151; Mansel (2018), pp. 445 and 454; Nasse (2019), pp. 799 f.; Nordhues (2019), pp. 317 f.; Palombo (2019), p. 280; Pataut (2017), p. 838. In a similar vein—with regard to the draft of 2015—Boskovic (2016), p. 387.

  76. 76.

    Assemblée nationale XIVe législature, Session ordinaire de 2014–2015, Première séance du lundi 30 mars 2015, Discussion to Amendment No. 18, available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cri/2014-2015/20150193.asp#P490680.

  77. 77.

    Barsan (2017), p. 432; Danis-Fatôme and Viney (2017), p. 1618; Parance and Groulx (2018), pp. 47 f.; Spitzer (2019), pp. 106 f.; Weller and Pato (2018), p. 414.

  78. 78.

    See the rapporteur’s answer to Amendment No. 18: “… ils sont satisfaits car ce qu’ils proposent est inclus non seulement dans l’esprit mais dans le texte de la proposition de loi.”

  79. 79.

    See for a detailed discussion Brabant and Savourey (2017a), pp. 1 ff.; Rühl (2020b), pp. 1418 ff.

  80. 80.

    That the Loi de vigilance only covers companies with registered seat does not follow from the wording of Article L. 225-102-4 I CCom, but was confirmed immediately after adoption of the law through the French Constitutional Council. See Conseil constitutionnel, Décision no 2017-750 DC du 23 mars 2017, para. 3, available at https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/2017/2017750DC.htm.

  81. 81.

    According to the predominant, although not uncontested, view, the Loi de vigilance also covers simplified public companies (societés par actions simplifies). See Daoud and Sfoggia (2019), p. 96; Hannoun (2017), p. 811. See also—with regard to the draft of 2015—Périn (2015), pp. 218.

  82. 82.

    Conseil général de l’économie (2020), pp. 18 ff. See also the detailed study by CCFD-Terre Solidaire and Sherpa (2019).

  83. 83.

    Fleischer and Danninger (2017), p. 2850: 150 companies; Brabant and Savourey (2017a), pp. 1 f: 150 to 200 companies; Renaud et al. (2019), p. 7: 300 companies.

  84. 84.

    CCFD-Terre Solidaire and Sherpa (2019), p. 10.

  85. 85.

    Rühl (2020b), pp. 1422 ff.

  86. 86.

    See for a detailed discussion Daoud and Sfoggia (2019), pp. 97 f.; Jazottes (2018), pp. 28 ff.; Nasse (2019), pp. 793 f.

  87. 87.

    Brabant and Savourey (2017b), p. 3; Hannoun (2017), p. 816; Métais and Valette (2019), p. 52; Rühl (2020b), pp. 1428 ff. In a similar vein—with regard to the draft of 2015—Périn (2015), pp. 218 and 224.

  88. 88.

    See, for example, Enneking (2017), p. 65; Kessedijan (2018), pp. 149 f.; Marx et al. (2019), pp. 114 f.; Van den Eeckhout (2012), p. 194; Van den Eeckhout (2017), pp. 57 f.

  89. 89.

    See for a detailed discussion Rühl (2011), pp. 655 f. (with further references).

  90. 90.

    See for a detailed presentation of the legislative history Petitjean (2019).

  91. 91.

    See, for example, https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/lieferkettengesetz-streit-ueber-eckpunkte-101.html.

  92. 92.

    Rühl (2020b), pp. 1430 f. See also the study on the practical application of the Loi de vigilance Renaud et al. (2019) as well as the official report of the Conseil général de l’économie (2020).

  93. 93.

    See, for example, Nordhues (2019), pp. 319 ff.

  94. 94.

    Rühl (2020a), pp. 123 ff.; Rühl (2020b), pp. 1431 f; Equally skeptical Bueno (2020), p. 244 (with regard to Swiss law); Wagner (2016), p. 781; Sykes (2012), p. 2197 (with regard to the Alien Tort Claims Act). See also Geistfeld (2019), pp. 142 ff., 144 f. who generally doubts that liability claims of the victims can set incentive to protect human rights and who, therefore, suggests to allow consumers in the Global North to sue companies for damages if they fail to comply with human rights relation information obligations.

  95. 95.

    See for a detailed empirical analysis of the costs that various types of regulation might incur British Institute of International and Comparative Law et al. (2020), Final Report, pp. 290 ff., especially 401 ff. as well as Synthesis Report, pp. 65 ff.

  96. 96.

    Rühl (2020a), pp. 123 ff.; Sykes (2012), pp. 2196 f. (“tools for strategic response”). See for an empirical analyses of current due diligence (market) practice British Institute of International and Comparative Law et al. (2020), Final Report, pp. 44 ff. and Synthesis Report, pp. 14 ff.

  97. 97.

    Note that the use of contractual clauses and codes of conduct is already the most frequently used due diligence action which companies undertake to prevent, mitigate or remedy adverse human rights and environmental impacts in their supply chains. See British Institute of International and Comparative Law et al. (2020), Final Report, p. 152 and Synthesis Report, p. 15.

  98. 98.

    Rühl (2020a), pp. 124 f.; For more on this problem see Sykes (2012), pp. 2185 f., 2198 ff. (“monitoring capacity”).

  99. 99.

    Rühl (2020a), pp. 125 f.; Sykes (2012), pp. 2164 f.; Wagner (2016), pp. 780 f.

  100. 100.

    See for a detailed analyses of consumers’ willingness to pay for better protection of human rights in global supply chains Geistfeld (2019), pp. 146 ff. See also the studies and experiments by Bartling et al. (2015), pp. 219 ff. Kimeldorf et al. (2006), pp. 24 ff.

  101. 101.

    Rühl (2020a), p. 125; Wagner (2016), pp. 780 f. Geistfeld (2019), p. 143; Weller et al. (2016), p. 418. See also—with regard to claims based on the Alien Tort Claims Act—Sykes (2012), pp. 2193 ff. 2202.

  102. 102.

    On this point Sykes (2012), pp. 2195 f. who notes that the Canadian company Talisman Energy was replaced by a Chinese company—after Talisman Energy had decided to withdraw from Sudan out of fear to be suit in den US on the basis of the Alien Tort Claims Act. See, however, Stiglitz (2011), pp. 10 ff., who considers these fears to be exaggerated and without empirical basis. Equally sceptical Keitner (2012), pp. 2214, 2215 f.

  103. 103.

    Rühl (2020a), pp. 125 f. See for a detailed discussion of regulatory options at EU level British Institute of International and Comparative Law et al. (2020), Final Report, pp. 239 ff. and Synthesis Report, pp. 42 ff.

  104. 104.

    See for an empirical analysis of the potential effects of regulation at EU level British Institute of International and Comparative Law et al. (2020), Final Report, pp. 142 ff. and Synthesis Report, pp. 19 f.

  105. 105.

    If adopted as regulation the provisions of a European instrument will apply as uniform international law that make the determination of the applicable law obsolete. If adopted as directive its national implementing provisions will qualify as overriding mandatory provision in the meaning of Article 16 Rome II Regulation in all Member States.

  106. 106.

    See generally on the effect of a European instrument on competition empirical analysis of British Institute of International and Comparative Law et al. (2020), Final Report, pp. 438 ff. as well as Synthesis Report, pp. 67 f.

  107. 107.

    In a similar vein British Institute of International and Comparative Law et al. (2020), Final Report, pp. 549 and 558 and Synthesis Report, pp. 70 f.

  108. 108.

    See http://corporatejustice.org/news/132-members-of-8-european-parliaments-support-duty-of-care-legislation-for-eu-corporations. See also the response of the European Commission in its Annual Report on Relations between the European Commission and National Parliaments, COM(2017) 601 final, p. 10.

  109. 109.

    Resolution of the European Parliament of 25 October 2016 on corporate liability for serious human rights abuses in third countries (2015/2315(INI)), P8_TA(2016)0405; Resolution of the European Parliament of 12 September 2017 on the impact of international trade and the EU’s trade policies on global value chains (2016/2301(INI)), P8_TA (2017)0330.

  110. 110.

    For more information on the group see https://responsiblebusinessconduct.eu.

  111. 111.

    Shadow EU Action Plan on the Implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights within the EU, available at https://responsiblebusinessconduct.eu/wp/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/SHADOW-EU-Action-Plan-on-Business-and-Human-Rights.pdf.

  112. 112.

    JURI Committee of the European Parliament, Draft Report with recommendations to the Commission on corporate due diligence and corporate accountability (2020/2129(INL)).

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Rühl, G. (2020). Towards a German Supply Chain Act? Comments from a Choice of Law and a Comparative Perspective. In: Bungenberg, M., Krajewski, M., Tams, C.J., Terhechte, J.P., Ziegler, A.R. (eds) European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2020. European Yearbook of International Economic Law, vol 11. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/8165_2020_61

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