Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The Changing Nature of Corporate Influence in the Making of International Economic Law: Towards “Multistakeholderism”

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2020

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EUROYEAR,volume 11))

  • 764 Accesses

Abstract

This contribution considers the influence of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the development of international economic law (IEL) and the institutional contexts in which this is exercised. Economic globalisation has increasingly empowered MNEs as participants in the development of IEL. Greater corporate power has arisen from increasingly market-based state and intergovernmental organisation (IGO) policies, the expertise and technical knowledge possessed by firms and the concurrent development of transnational commercial and technical networks requiring new forms of regulation to operate successfully. MNEs have traditionally influenced IEL through lobbying and consultations before IGOs, within certain procedural boundaries based on the multilateral, state-focused, nature of IGOs. In more recent years, traditional IGO-based systems of influence have been complemented, and in some areas replaced, by multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs). Their core characteristic is the involvement of “stakeholders”, global actors who have a “stake” in an issue, who come together to work out a collaborative solution to issues of mutual concern. In MSIs the participants, including MNEs, have a direct capacity to create new regulatory norms independently of states and IGOs. MSIs will be examined through a series of illustrative examples taken from the field of corporate social responsibility. The implications of these developments for norm creation, and for effective and legitimate governance, will be considered. The contribution will end by briefly discussing the future challenges posed to MSIs given the uncertain future of global economic regulation amid the rise of assertive economic nationalism.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
$34.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 169.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. 1.

    See generally the contributions in Noortmann and Ryngaert (2010). See also Noortmann et al. (2015) and Ryngaert (2016). See also Arato (2015), who suggests that corporate actors make IEL through the conclusion of investment contracts which acquire the force of law through investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) conducted before arbitral tribunals, and Stephan (2011), who discusses the impact of private non-state actors in the development of international law.

  2. 2.

    See further Muchlinski (2011, 2012).

  3. 3.

    See Pauwelyn et al. (2012), pp. 501–505.

  4. 4.

    See Muchlinski (2011) and (2012).

  5. 5.

    See Gleckmann (2018), Preface para. xiii. See also Raymond and Denardis (2015), p. 574, who assert, “multistakeholderism entails two or more classes of actors engaged in a common governance enterprise concerning issues they regard as public in nature and characterized by polyarchic authority relations constituted by procedural rules.” Polyarchy, “entails situations where authority is distributed among a number of actors” Raymond and Denardis (2015), p. 580.

  6. 6.

    This section draws upon Muchlinski (2021), ch. 3 sec. 3(b).

  7. 7.

    See Ruggie (1982, 1992) and Wilkinson (2000).

  8. 8.

    See Kollen Ghizoni S, Nixon Ends Convertibility of US Dollars to Gold and Announces Wage/Price Controls, Federal Reserve History, August 1971, https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/gold_convertibility_ends?view=print (last accessed 21 August 2020); Ray (1987).

  9. 9.

    See further Slobodian (2018), Harvey (2007) and Eagleton-Price (2016); Metcalfe S, Neoliberalism: the idea that swallowed the world, The Guardian, 17 August 2017 https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/aug/18/neoliberalism-the-idea-that-changed-the-world (last accessed 21 August 2020). For a perspective doubting the value of the term see Venugopal (2015). For a useful introduction to “neo-classical” or “neo-liberal” theories of international economic organisation see Sally (1998).

  10. 10.

    See Fuchs (2007), ch. 6.

  11. 11.

    “Market-state” denotes a state that outsources public functions to private providers, uses public–private partnerships to deliver public services and infrastructure, privatises public enterprises, and liberalises and deregulates markets and firms. See further Crouch (2004) and Crouch (2011).

  12. 12.

    See further Slobodian (2018).

  13. 13.

    See Hood and Young (1979), p. 327.

  14. 14.

    See Cata Backer (2008).

  15. 15.

    See Muchlinski P, Corporations in International Law, Max Planck Encyclopaedia of International Law, last updated June 2014, https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1513 (last accessed 21 August 2020), para. 6–9.

  16. 16.

    See Arato (2015).

  17. 17.

    See for an historical perspective linking investment protection treaties to “neoliberal” ideas, Slobodian (2018), pp. 136–143.

  18. 18.

    See further Likosky (2005, 2006).

  19. 19.

    Wilks (2013), pp. 37–40. See further Fuchs (2007), ch. 3, 6. See also Ruggie (2018).

  20. 20.

    See further Yaziji and Doh (2009).

  21. 21.

    Fuchs (2007), p. 154.

  22. 22.

    See Gleckmann (2018), pp. 30–33 on which this paragraph draws.

  23. 23.

    This is in part due to the transparency required under the US Lobbying Disclosure Act 1995 as amended (2 U.S.C. §1601, et seq.); see Straus J, The Lobbying Disclosure Act at 20: Analysis and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service 7-5700, 1 December 2015, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44292.pdf (last accessed 21 August 2020). The UK introduced a similar law in 2014: Transparency of Lobbying, Non-party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 c. 4, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/4 (last accessed 21 August 2020). See further OECD, Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, https://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/oecdprinciplesfortransparencyandintegrityinlobbying.htm (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  24. 24.

    See e.g. Vernon (1973), Strange (1994) and Stopford et al. (1991). For a review of more recent contributions to this debate see Ougaard (2008).

  25. 25.

    See e.g. Rowlands (2001) and Falkner (2003).

  26. 26.

    Robert-Nicoud F and Baldwin R, Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers, CEP Discussion Paper No. 791, May 2007, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/19726/1/Entry_and_Asymmetric_Lobbying_Why_Governments_Pick_Losers.pdf (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  27. 27.

    Manger (2012).

  28. 28.

    Kim and Osgood (2019).

  29. 29.

    Kim I and Miller H, Multinational Corporations and their Influence Through Lobbying on Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution, 2 December 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Kim_Milner_manuscript.pdf (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  30. 30.

    Ibid, p. 6.

  31. 31.

    Ibid.

  32. 32.

    See further St John (2018), ch. 4–5, who notes at pp. 111–117 that World Bank officials had a choice of foreign investment promotion policies between a multilateral code, international investment insurance and a dispute settlement body. They dismissed a multilateral code as carrying too much political risk. Developing countries would believe it was biased against them while developed countries would see any compromise code as too weak. Dispute settlement was preferred mainly on the grounds of lower cost and ease of implementation as compared to investment insurance.

  33. 33.

    See St John (2018), p. 22 and ch. 8; and see further van Harten (2007).

  34. 34.

    On which see further Durkee (2018).

  35. 35.

    Ibid., p. 1750.

  36. 36.

    Ibid.

  37. 37.

    Ibid.

  38. 38.

    See ECOSOC, Introduction to ECOSOC Consultative Status, http://csonet.org/index.php?menu=30 (last accessed 21 August 2020) and ECOSOC, Res. 1996/31, 24 July 1996, http://csonet.org/content/documents/199631.pdf (last accessed 21 August 2020). See further United Nations, Working with ECOSOC: an NGOs Guide to Consultative Status, 2018, http://csonet.org/index.php?menu=134 (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  39. 39.

    ECOSOC, Res. 1996/31, 24 July 1996, http://csonet.org/content/documents/199631.pdf (last accessed 21 August 2020), para 13.

  40. 40.

    Durkee (2018), pp. 1766–1774.

  41. 41.

    WHO, Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors, WHA69.10 Agenda item 11.3, 28 May 2016, https://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/wha69/a69_r10-en.pdf (last accessed 21 August 2020); Durkee (2018), pp. 1806–1809.

  42. 42.

    See, for the various methods used to undermine the WHO initiatives during the 1990s, Committee of Experts on Tobacco Industry, Tobacco Company Strategies to Undermine Tobacco Control Activities at the World Health Organisation, July 2000, https://perma.cc/9WKS-5N3X (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  43. 43.

    WHO, Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors, 28 May 2016, https://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/wha69/a69_r10-en.pdf (last accessed 21 August 2020), para. 37–43.

  44. 44.

    Ibid para. 10.

  45. 45.

    Ibid para. 13.

  46. 46.

    By Article 3(1) of the ILO Constitution, Member States are entitled to send four representatives: two governmental representatives and, by agreement, one each from the most representative employers and trade union organisations in the country. See further ILO, Rules of the Game: A brief introduction to International Labour Standards, 2014 http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/%2D%2D-ed_norm/%2D%2D-normes/documents/publication/wcms_318141.pdf (last accessed 21 August 2020), pp. 14–20; Servais (2017), ch. 3; Hepple (2005), ch. 2.

  47. 47.

    See FAO, Strategy for Partnerships with Civil Society Organisations, 2013, http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3443e.pdf (last accessed 21 August 2020), pp. 3 and 8. See also FAO, Strategy for Partnerships with the Private Sector, 2013, http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3444e.pdf (last accessed 23 August 2020), which introduces a risk assessment strategy to avoid potential conflicts of interest with private sector partners.

  48. 48.

    For detailed discussion see Durkee (2018), pp. 1812–1817. See further IMF, Civil Society and the IMF, https://www.imf.org/en/About/Partners/civil-society (last accessed 21 August 2020). In 2007 France criticised the informal working methods of UNCITRAL see UNCITRAL, France’s Observations on UNCITRAL’s working methods, UN Doc. A/CN.9/635, 24 May 2007, https://undocs.org/en/A/CN.9/635 (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  49. 49.

    UNCTAD, UNCTAD and Civil Society, https://unctad.org/en/Pages/About%20UNCTAD/UNCTAD%20And%20Civil%20Society/UNCTAD-And-Civil-Society.aspx (last accessed 21 August 2020). The procedure is governed by rule 77 of the rules of procedure of the Trade and Development Board, and its Decisions 43 (VII) and 507 (EX–53).

  50. 50.

    UNCTAD, Organisations with Observer Status, https://unctad.org/en/Pages/About%20UNCTAD/UNCTAD%20And%20Civil%20Society/NGOs-IGOs-with-observer-status.aspx (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  51. 51.

    See UNCTAD, List of non-governmental organizations participating in the activities of UNCTAD, UN Doc. TD/B/NGO/LIST/26, 16 December 2019, https://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/tdngolistd26_en.pdf (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  52. 52.

    WTO, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  53. 53.

    On the development of WTO engagement with NGOs see Perez-Esteve M, WTO rules and practices for transparency and engagement with civil society organizations, Staff Working Paper ERSD-2012-14, 18 September 2012, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201214_e.pdf (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  54. 54.

    WTO, NGOs and the WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngo_e.htm#:~:text=NGOs%20can%20be%20accredited%20to,of%20discussions%20between%20WTO%20members (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  55. 55.

    See further Hoad (2002), Gad (2003) and De Bièvre et al. (2016).

  56. 56.

    See Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation Distribution and Sale of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds27_e.htm (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  57. 57.

    See Hoekman and Kostecki (2009), p. 160.

  58. 58.

    Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation Distribution and Sale of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds27_e.htm (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  59. 59.

    Curran and Eckhardt (2017).

  60. 60.

    Appellate Body Report, Australia – Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WT/DS435/27 WT/DS441/28, adopted 29 June 2020, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds435_e.htm#bkmk435abr (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  61. 61.

    See Walker A, Trade disputes settlement system facing crisis, BBC News, 8 December 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-50681431 (last accessed 21 August 2020). See further Pauwelyn (2019). See also Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2020 Trade Policy Agenda and 2019 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program, 2019, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2020_Trade_Policy_Agenda_and_2019_Annual_Report.pdf (last accessed 21 August 2020), especially pp. 13–14. For a Chinese critique of the US position see Guohua (2019).

  62. 62.

    See Durkee (2018), pp. 1823–1825.

  63. 63.

    Durkee (2018), pp. 1823–1825, and see further Durkee (2017).

  64. 64.

    On which see further Gleckmann (2018), ch. 1.

  65. 65.

    See Rowlands (2001); Dodds et al. (2019).

  66. 66.

    The UNCED recognised nine “Major Groups” representing the main currents of stakeholder interest in UN activities related to sustainable development. There were: women, children and youth, indigenous peoples, NGOs, local authorities, workers and trade unions, business and industry and the scientific and technical community and farmers: Strandenaes (2019), pp. 15–16. For the history of stakeholder engagement prior to the UNCED and subsequently up to the UN Sustainable Development Goals see Dodds et al. (2019) ch. 3.

  67. 67.

    See Gleckman (1995), pp. 95–97.

  68. 68.

    UNCED, Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, 3 to 14 June 1992, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  69. 69.

    See Gleckman (1995), pp. 95–97; Rowlands (2001), p. 144; Ford (2004), pp. 310–312.

  70. 70.

    See UN Sustainable Development Goals Knowledge Platform, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300 (last accessed 21 August 2020) and Dodds (2019), pp. 88–93.

  71. 71.

    UN GA, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UN Doc. A /RES/70/1, 21 October 2015, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld (last accessed 21 August 2020), para. 41.

  72. 72.

    UN Sustainable Development Goals Knowledge Platform, Stakeholder Engagement: Business and Industry, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/majorgroups/businessandindustry (last accessed 21 August 2020). On multi-stakeholder partnerships in the UN system in the field of sustainable development see further the contributions in Dodds (2019).

  73. 73.

    See Gleckmann (2018), pp. 12–13.

  74. 74.

    Gleckmann (2018), pp. 12–13.

  75. 75.

    See further Raymond and Denardis (2015). See also Antonova (2008).

  76. 76.

    ICANN, ICANN History Project”, https://www.icann.org/history (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  77. 77.

    ICANN, Beginners Guide to Participating in ICANN, 2013, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/beginners-guides-2012-03-06-en (last accessed 21 August 2020), p. 2.

  78. 78.

    For analysis of the difficulties surrounding multistakeholderism in ICANN see Radu (2019), ch. 4. See also ICANN, History: 6 January, 2017 Last Formal Agreement with U.S. Government Ends, https://www.icann.org/en/history/icann-usg (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  79. 79.

    See Jerbi (2012) and Tamo (2016).

  80. 80.

    See generally Gleckmann (2018), pp. 16–25.

  81. 81.

    See for background Holmes (2007), Wexler (2010) and Howard (2016).

  82. 82.

    See Kimberley Process, List of Participants – 2020 Status, https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/2020-kp-participants-list (last accessed 21 August 2020). See, most recently, UN GA, The role of diamonds in fuelling conflict: breaking the link between the illicit transaction of rough diamonds and armed conflict as a contribution to prevention and settlement of conflicts, UN Doc. A/74/L.39, 6 February 2020, https://undocs.org/en/A/74/L.39 (last accessed 23 August 2020).

  83. 83.

    Kimberley Process, What is the Kimberley Process?, https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/what-kp (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  84. 84.

    Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Section IV, https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/kpcs-core-document (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  85. 85.

    See Cullen (2013), pp. 77–78.

  86. 86.

    Global Witness, Global Witness leaves Kimberley Process, calls on diamond trade to be held accountable, 2 December 2011, https://www.globalwitness.org/en/archive/global-witness-leaves-kimberley-process-calls-diamond-trade-be-held-accountable/ (last accessed 21 August 2020). See further Cullen (2013), pp. 70–77; Winetroub (2013).

  87. 87.

    See Global Witness, Campaigns: Conflict Diamonds, https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/conflict-diamonds/#more (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  88. 88.

    See further, on the role of private business actors in supporting the implementation and enforcement of international law, Butler (2020).

  89. 89.

    See Ezeudu (2014).

  90. 90.

    See further Winetroub (2013) for a detailed analysis of possible reforms.

  91. 91.

    See World Diamond Council, Kimberley Process must grasp historic opportunity to correct its limitations, WDC President to tell special UN General Assembly meeting in New York, 28 February 2019, https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/press-release-kp-must-grasp-historic-opportunity-correct-its-limitations-wdc-president-tell-special (last accessed 21 August 2020) and World Diamond Council, WDC to continue advocating for the strengthening of the scope of Kimberley Process, 22 November 2019, https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/press-release-world-diamond-council-following-kimberley-process-plenary-meeting-new-delhi-india (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  92. 92.

    See ISO, Standards, https://www.iso.org/standards.html (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  93. 93.

    See ISO, About US: Members, https://www.iso.org/members.html (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  94. 94.

    See Clapp (2004). But see Fontanelli (2011) who argues that ISO and Codex Alimentarius Commission standards are not transformed into hard law by the WTO TBS and SPS Agreements but are used as factual benchmarks in determining whether a Member’s domestic measures infringe their terms.

  95. 95.

    See ISO, Key Principles in ISO Standard Development, https://www.iso.org/developing-standards.html (last accessed 21 August 2020). There are currently 328 Technical Committees: ISO, List of Technical Committees, https://www.iso.org/technical-committees.html (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  96. 96.

    See Fontanelli (2011), pp. 903–904.

  97. 97.

    See ISO, The ISO 14000 Family Environmental Management, https://www.iso.org/iso-14001-environmental-management.html (last accessed 21 August 2020). On how business interests were promoted over other interests, including those of developing countries, in the ISO 14000 standard setting process see Clapp (2004) and Mikulich (2003).

  98. 98.

    See Webb (2015) on which this paragraph draws.

  99. 99.

    Webb (2015), p. 475.

  100. 100.

    Webb (2015), pp. 477–480.

  101. 101.

    Webb (2015), p. 476.

  102. 102.

    Webb (2015), pp. 481–483 on which the ensuing text draws.

  103. 103.

    UN, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 2011, https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  104. 104.

    See Clapp (2004).

  105. 105.

    See Fontanelli (2011).

  106. 106.

    See further Webb (2015), pp. 483–500.

  107. 107.

    This study is taken from Muchlinski (2021), ch. 13.

  108. 108.

    Bangladesh Accord Foundation, Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, 13 May 2013, https://admin.bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/2013-Accord.pdf (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  109. 109.

    Bangladesh Accord Foundation, About the Accord, http://bangladeshaccord.org/about/ (last accessed 21 August 2020). For the full list of brand and trade union signatories see http://bangladeshaccord.org/signatories/ (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  110. 110.

    Text available at 2018 Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh: May 2018, 21 June 2017, https://admin.bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/2018-Accord.pdf (last accessed). All references are to the 2018 Bangladesh Accord Revision.

  111. 111.

    Ibid para. 4–6.

  112. 112.

    Ibid para. 7–10.

  113. 113.

    Ibid para. 19.

  114. 114.

    Ibid para. 12a.

  115. 115.

    Ibid para. 11, 13 and 10.

  116. 116.

    Ibid para. 16.

  117. 117.

    Ibid para. 17.

  118. 118.

    See “152 Ineligible Suppliers” at Bangladesh Accord Foundation, https://bangladeshaccord.org/factories (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  119. 119.

    Rawling (2015), p. 672.

  120. 120.

    See Sinkovics et al. (2016).

  121. 121.

    Ibid.

  122. 122.

    Ibid p. 644 and see further Rawling (2015), p. 670; Selwyn (2013).

  123. 123.

    2018 Bangladesh Accord Revision, Introduction para. 2.

  124. 124.

    See further the case studies in Jerbi (2012) who examines, in addition to the Kimberley Process, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, and the role of multi-stakeholder arrangements in operationalizing the UNGPs.

  125. 125.

    See e.g. De Beers, Why De Beers, https://www.debeers.co.uk/en-gb/why-de-beers.html (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  126. 126.

    Webb (2015), pp. 481–482.

  127. 127.

    See Gleckmann (2018), especially ch. 4 and 5; Buxton N et al., Multistakeholderism: a critical look, Workshop Report, The Transnational Institute, 10 September 2019, https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/multistakeholderism-workshop-report-tni.pdf (last accessed 23 August 2020); Schleifer (2019) and Biekart and Fowler (2018).

  128. 128.

    See Gleckmann (2018), pp. 65–71.

  129. 129.

    See on corporate influence over MSIs, Buxton N et al., Multistakeholderism: a critical look, Workshop Report, The Transnational Institute, 10 September 2019, https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/multistakeholderism-workshop-report-tni.pdf (last accessed 23 August 2020).

  130. 130.

    See further Schleifer (2019) comparing the differing levels of stakeholder engagement and business control in the Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials, the Roundtable on Responsible Soy, and Bonsucro, formerly known as the Better Sugarcane Initiative.

  131. 131.

    See McKeon (2017).

  132. 132.

    Gleckmann (2018), pp. 87–89.

  133. 133.

    See further MSI Integrity and the Duke Human Rights Centre at the Kenan Institute for Ethics, The New Regulators? Assessing the landscape of multi-stakeholder initiatives, June 2017, http://www.msi-integrity.org/dev/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/The-New-Regulators-MSI-Database-Report.pdf (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  134. 134.

    See Molina-Gallart (2014) discussing such imbalances in NGO-corporate partnerships.

  135. 135.

    See Buxton N et al., Multistakeholderism: a critical look, Workshop Report, The Transnational Institute, 10 September 2019, https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/multistakeholderism-workshop-report-tni.pdf (last accessed 23 August 2020), p. 10.

  136. 136.

    Gleckmann (2018), pp. 90–92.

  137. 137.

    See further Gleckmann (2018), pp. 121–124.

  138. 138.

    On financing see further Gleckmann (2018), pp. 129–131 stressing also the need for financial transparency in relation to the operating and programme budgets of the MSI.

  139. 139.

    Gleckmann (2018), p. 98.

  140. 140.

    See further Gleckmann (2018), pp.125–129.

  141. 141.

    ISEAL, ISEAL Credibility Principles, June 2013, https://www.isealalliance.org/credible-sustainability-standards/iseal-credibility-principles (last accessed 21 August 2020) on which this paragraph draws. ISEAL is currently undertaking a revision of this instrument: https://www.isealalliance.org/credibility-principles-consultation (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  142. 142.

    See MSI Integrity, Our Mission and Vision, http://www.msi-integrity.org/test-home/mission-principles/ (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  143. 143.

    MSI Integrity, MSI Evaluation Tool, http://www.msi-integrity.org/evaluations/msi-evaluation-tool-2/ (last accessed 21 August 2020). See also MSI Integrity, The Essential Elements of MSI Design, 2017, http://www.msi-integrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Essential_Elements_2017.pdf (last accessed 21 August 2020).

  144. 144.

    MSI Integrity, The Essential Elements of MSI Design, 2017, http://www.msi-integrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Essential_Elements_2017.pdf (last accessed 21 August 2020), p. 6.

  145. 145.

    See further Webb (2015).

  146. 146.

    On which see further Ginsburg (2020) and Buxton N et al., Multistakeholderism: a critical look, Workshop Report, The Transnational Institute, 10 September 2019, https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/multistakeholderism-workshop-report-tni.pdf (last accessed 23 August 2020), p. 13.

  147. 147.

    See Buxton N et al., Multistakeholderism: a critical look, Workshop Report, The Transnational Institute, 10 September 2019, https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/multistakeholderism-workshop-report-tni.pdf (last accessed 23 August 2020), p. 13.

  148. 148.

    See Johns et al. (2019).

  149. 149.

    Buxton N et al., Multistakeholderism: a critical look, Workshop Report, The Transnational Institute, 10 September 2019, https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/multistakeholderism-workshop-report-tni.pdf (last accessed 23 August 2020), p. 13.

  150. 150.

    On which see Muchlinski (2021), ch. 14 and Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, Mandatory Due Diligence, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/mandatory-due-diligence (last accessed 23 August 2020).

References

  • Antonova S (2008) Powerscape of internet governance – how was global multistakeholderism invented in ICANN? VDM Verlag, Saarbrücken

    Google Scholar 

  • Arato J (2015) Corporations as lawmakers. Harv Int Law J 56(2):229–295

    Google Scholar 

  • Biekart K, Fowler A (2018) Ownership dynamics in local multi-stakeholder initiatives. Third World Q 39(9):1692–1710

    Google Scholar 

  • Butler J (2020) The corporate keepers of international law. Am J Int Law 114(2):189–220

    Google Scholar 

  • Cata Backer L (2008) Multinational corporations as objects and sources of transnational regulation. ILSA J Int Comp Law 14(2):499–523

    Google Scholar 

  • Clapp J (2004) The privatization of global environmental governance: ISO 14000 and the developing world. In: Levy D, Newell P (eds) The business of global environmental governance. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 223–248

    Google Scholar 

  • Crouch C (2004) Post-democracy. Polity Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Crouch C (2011) The strange non-death of neoliberalism. Polity Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Cullen H (2013) Is there future for the Kimberley process certification scheme for conflict diamonds? Macquarie Law J 12:61–80

    Google Scholar 

  • Curran L, Eckhardt J (2017) Smoke screen? The globalization of production, transnational lobbying and the international political economy of plain tobacco packaging. Rev Int Polit Econ 24(1):87–118

    Google Scholar 

  • De Bièvre D, Poletti A, Hanegraaff M, Beyers J (2016) International institutions and interest mobilization: the WTO and lobbying in EU and US trade policy. J World Trade 50(2):289–312

    Google Scholar 

  • Dodds F et al (2019) Stakeholder democracy: represented democracy in a time of fear. Routledge, Abingdon

    Google Scholar 

  • Durkee M (2017) Astroturf activism. Stanford Law Rev 69:201–268

    Google Scholar 

  • Durkee M (2018) International lobbying law. Yale Law J 127:1742–1826

    Google Scholar 

  • Eagleton-Price M (2016) Neoliberalism: the key concepts. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Ezeudu M (2014) From soft law process to hard law obligations: the Kimberley process and contemporary international legislative process. Eur J Law Reform 16(1):104–132

    Google Scholar 

  • Falkner R (2003) Private environmental governance and international relations: exploring the links. Global Environ Politics 3(2):72–87

    Google Scholar 

  • Fontanelli F (2011) ISO and codex standards and international trade law: what gets said is not what’s heard. Int Comp Law Q 60(4):895–932

    Google Scholar 

  • Ford L (2004) Challenging global environmental governance of toxics: social movement agency and global civil society. In: Levy D, Newell P (eds) The business of global environmental governance. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 305–328

    Google Scholar 

  • Fuchs D (2007) Business power in global governance. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder

    Google Scholar 

  • Gad M (2003) Impact of multinational enterprises on multilateral rule making: the pharmaceutical industry and the TRIPS Uruguay round negotiations. Law Bus Rev Am 9(4):667–698

    Google Scholar 

  • Ginsburg T (2020) Authoritarian international law? Am J Int Law 114(2):221–260

    Google Scholar 

  • Gleckman H (1995) Transnational corporations’ strategic responses to ‘sustainable development. In: Bergesen H, Parmann G, Thommessen Ø (eds) Green globe yearbook. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 93–106

    Google Scholar 

  • Gleckmann H (2018) Multistakeholder governance and democracy: a global challenge. Routledge, Abingdon

    Google Scholar 

  • Guohua Y (2019) The causes of the crisis confronting the WTO appellate body. J WTO China 9(4):102–126

    Google Scholar 

  • Harvey D (2007) A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Hepple B (2005) Labour laws and global trade. Hart Publishing, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Hoad D (2002) The World Trade Organisation, corporate interests and global opposition: Seattle and after. Geography 87(2):148–154

    Google Scholar 

  • Hoekman B, Kostecki M (2009) Political economy of the world trading system: WTO and beyond. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Holmes J (2007) The Kimberley process: evidence of change in international law. Brigham Young Univ Int Law ManagReview 3(2):213–232

    Google Scholar 

  • Hood N, Young S (1979) The economics of multinational enterprise. Longman, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Howard A (2016) Blood diamonds: the successes and failures of the Kimberley process certification scheme in Angola, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe. Wash Univ Global Stud Law Rev 15(1):137–160

    Google Scholar 

  • Jerbi S (2012) Assessing the roles of multi-stakeholder initiatives in advancing the business and human rights agenda. Int Rev Red Cross 94(887):1027–1046

    Google Scholar 

  • Johns L, Pelc K, Wellhausen R (2019) How a retreat from global economic governance may empower business interests. J Polit 81(2):731–738

    Google Scholar 

  • Kim I, Osgood I (2019) Firms in trade and trade politics. Annu Rev Polit Sci 22:399–417

    Google Scholar 

  • Likosky M (2005) Privatising development: transnational law, infrastructure and human rights. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden

    Google Scholar 

  • Likosky M (2006) Law, infrastructure and human rights. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Manger M (2012) Vertical trade specialization and the formation of North-South PTAs. World Polit 64(4):622–658

    Google Scholar 

  • McKeon N (2017) Are equity and sustainability a likely outcome when foxes and chickens share the same coop? Critiquing the concept of multistakeholder governance of food security. Globalizations 14(3):379–398

    Google Scholar 

  • Mikulich C (2003) ISO 14000-14001, the developing world’s perspective. Tulane Environ Law J 17(1):117–162

    Google Scholar 

  • Molina-Gallart N (2014) Strange bedfellows? NGO–corporate relations in international development: an NGO perspective. Development studies research. Open Access J 1(1):42–53

    Google Scholar 

  • Muchlinski P (2011) The changing face of transnational business governance: private corporate law liability and accountability of transnational groups in a post-financial crisis world. Indiana J Global Legal Stud 18(2):665–705

    Google Scholar 

  • Muchlinski P (2012) Multinational enterprises and international economic law: contesting regulatory agendas over the last twenty years. Jpn Yearb Int Econ Law 21:53–92

    Google Scholar 

  • Muchlinski P (2021) Multinational enterprises and the law. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Noortmann M, Ryngaert C (2010) Non-state actor dynamics in international law: from law-takers to law-makers. Ashgate Publishing, Farnham

    Google Scholar 

  • Noortmann M, Reinisch A, Ryngaert C (2015) Non-state actors in international law. Hart Publishing, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Ougaard M (2008) Review essay: private institutions and business power in global governance. Glob Gov 14(3):387–403

    Google Scholar 

  • Pauwelyn J (2019) WTO dispute settlement post 2019: what to expect? J Int Econ Law 22(3):297–321

    Google Scholar 

  • Pauwelyn J, Wessel R, Wouters J (2012) Informal international lawmaking: an assessment and template to keep it both effective and accountable. In: Pauwelyn J, Wessel R, Wouters J (eds) Informal international lawmaking. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 500–537

    Google Scholar 

  • Radu R (2019) Negotiating internet governance. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawling M (2015) Legislative regulation of global value chains to protect workers: a preliminary assessment. Econ Labour Relat Rev 26(4):660–677

    Google Scholar 

  • Ray E (1987) Changing patterns of protectionism: the fall in tariffs and the rise in non-tariff barriers symposium: the political economy of international trade law and policy. Northwest J Int Law Bus 8:285–327

    Google Scholar 

  • Raymond M, DeNardis L (2015) Multistakeholderism: anatomy of an inchoate global institution. Int Theory 7(3):572–616

    Google Scholar 

  • Rowlands I (2001) Transnational corporations and global environmental politics. In: Josselin D, Wallace W (eds) Non-state actors in world politics. Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp 133–149

    Google Scholar 

  • Ruggie J (1982) International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order. Int Organ 36(2):379–415

    Google Scholar 

  • Ruggie J (1992) Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution. Int Organ 46(3):561–598

    Google Scholar 

  • Ruggie J (2018) Multinationals as global institution: power, authority and relative autonomy. Regulat Govern 12(3):317–333

    Google Scholar 

  • Ryngaert C (2016) Non-state actors: carving out a space in a state-centred international legal system. Netherlands Int Law Rev 63:183–195

    Google Scholar 

  • Sally R (1998) Classical liberalism and international economic order. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Schleifer P (2019) Varieties of multi-stakeholder governance: selecting legitimation strategies in transnational sustainability politics. Globalizations 16(1):50–66

    Google Scholar 

  • Selwyn B (2013) Social upgrading and labour in global production networks: a critique and an alternative conception. Compet Chang 17(1):75–90

    Google Scholar 

  • Servais JM (2017) International labour law. Kluwer Law International, The Hague

    Google Scholar 

  • Sinkovics N, Ferdous Hoque S, Sinkovics R (2016) Rana Plaza collapse aftermath: are CSR compliance and auditing pressures effective? Account Auditing Accountability J 29(4):617–649

    Google Scholar 

  • Slobodian Q (2018) Globalists: the end of empire and the birth of neoliberalism. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • St John T (2018) The rise of investor-state arbitration: politics, law and unintended consequences. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Stephan P (2011) Privatizing international law. Va Law Rev 97(7):1573–1664

    Google Scholar 

  • Stopford J, Strange S, Henley J (1991) Rival states, rival firms. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Strandenaes J (2019) Stakeholder democracy – re-engaging the peoples of the world. In: Dodds F et al (eds) Stakeholder democracy: represented democracy in a time of fear. Routledge, Abingdon, pp 7–21

    Google Scholar 

  • Strange S (1994) States and markets. Continuum, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Tamo A (2016) New thinking on transnational corporations and human rights: towards a multi-stakeholder approach. Netherlands Q Human Rights 34(2):147–173

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Harten G (2007) Investment treaty arbitration and public law. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Venugopal R (2015) Neoliberalism as concept. Econ Soc 44(2):165–187

    Google Scholar 

  • Vernon R (1973) Sovereignty at bay. Pelican, Harmondsworth

    Google Scholar 

  • Webb K (2015) ISO 26000 social responsibility standard as ‘proto law’ and a new form of global custom: positioning ISO 26000 in the emerging transnational regulatory governance rule instrument architecture. Transnational Legal Theory 6(2):466–500

    Google Scholar 

  • Wexler L (2010) Regulating resource curses: institutional design and evolution of the blood diamond regime. Cardozo Law Rev 31(5):1717–1780

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilkinson R (2000) Multilateralism and the World Trade Organization. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilks S (2013) The political power of the business corporation. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham

    Google Scholar 

  • Winetroub A (2013) A diamond scheme is forever lost: the Kimberley process’s deteriorating tripartite structure and its consequences for the scheme’s survival. Indiana J Global Legal Stud 20(2):1425–1444

    Google Scholar 

  • Yaziji M, Doh J (2009) NGOs and corporations: conflict and collaboration. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. The School of Law, SOAS, University of London, London, UK

    Peter Muchlinski

Authors
  1. Peter Muchlinski
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Peter Muchlinski .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Law, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany

    Marc Bungenberg

  2. Faculty of Law, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Erlangen, Germany

    Markus Krajewski

  3. School of Law, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

    Christian J. Tams

  4. Competition and Regulation Institute, Leuphana University of Lüneburg, Lüneburg, Germany

    Jörg Philipp Terhechte

  5. Faculty of Law and Criminal Sciences, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland

    Andreas R. Ziegler

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Muchlinski, P. (2020). The Changing Nature of Corporate Influence in the Making of International Economic Law: Towards “Multistakeholderism”. In: Bungenberg, M., Krajewski, M., Tams, C.J., Terhechte, J.P., Ziegler, A.R. (eds) European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2020. European Yearbook of International Economic Law, vol 11. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/8165_2020_52

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/8165_2020_52

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-59070-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-59071-0

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation