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The Appellate Body of the WTO: An International Court by Another Name

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European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2019

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EUROYEAR,volume 10))

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Abstract

Albeit originally designed to review a few cases per year, the WTO’s Appellate Body quickly became the busiest international dispute settlement forum. Ironically, as it faces the looming threat of paralysis, this quasi-court is also being suggested by some as a prototype for other areas of international adjudication. The Appellate Body is truly at a defining moment in its history. WTO member states should reflect about the role that this adjudicatory body plays as an international tribunal and whether its original features still serve its mandate. The current number and complexity of its caseload calls for an upgrading of its structure. This chapter argues that the remarkable work conducted over the last decades by Appellate Body members makes them worthy of being treated as real judges. While this proposal will not be a panacea for all of the ills of the Appellate Body, and political consensus is increasingly harder to achieve, moving Appellate Body members to a full-time status could enhance the gravitas of their position and reinforce public perceptions of authority and legitimacy.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Weiler (2002), p. 177.

  2. 2.

    WTO, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (hereafter ‘DSU’), article 3.2, <https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu.pdf>.

  3. 3.

    DSU, art. 17.1. The Dispute Settlement Body formally set up the Appellate Body in its Decision of 10 February 1995 on the Establishment of the Appellate Body—WT/DSB/1, of 19 June 1995 (henceforth ‘Decision of the DSB of 10 February 1995’).

  4. 4.

    DSU, art. 17.3.

  5. 5.

    DSU, art. 17.3.

  6. 6.

    DSU, arts. 17.1 and 17.6.

  7. 7.

    DSU, art. 17.2.

  8. 8.

    Van den Bossche (2006), p. 297. See also Elsig (2017). One official who was involved in the negotiations described this unexpected outcome as follows: ‘I couldn’t believe it myself. Why had the US accepted the creation of the Appellate Body?’—Elsig and Eckhardt (2015), p. 20.

  9. 9.

    Shaffer et al. (2016), pp. 243–244; Von Bogdandy and Venzke (2014), p. 88; VanGrasstek (2013), p. 241. According to the chairman of the WTO dispute settlement negotiations and first chairman of the Appellate Body, the late Julio Lacarte, many member states believed that panels would continue to be the ‘backbone’ of WTO dispute settlement and that the Appellate Body would be called upon ‘infrequently’—see Graham (2017), p. 114.

  10. 10.

    Graham (2016), p. 3; Graham (2017), p. 113.

  11. 11.

    Mavroidis (2008), p. 367.

  12. 12.

    VanGrasstek (2013), p. 242.

  13. 13.

    Ehlermann (2004), p. 503; Hughes (2005b), p. 26; Azevêdo (2014), p. 2; Hughes (2008), p. 494.

  14. 14.

    Hughes (2008), p. 494; Hughes (2009), p. 282.

  15. 15.

    Azevêdo (2014), p. 2; VanGrasstek (2013), p. 242; Wha Chang (2017), p. 105.

  16. 16.

    Howse (2016), p. 10.

  17. 17.

    Van den Bossche (2003), p. 3; Van den Bossche and Zdouc (2013), p. 157; de Baere et al. (2016), p. 773.

  18. 18.

    Huber and Tereposky (2017), p. 546.

  19. 19.

    Matsushita (2012), p. 510.

  20. 20.

    Palmeter (2008), p. 854.

  21. 21.

    Mavroidis (2013), p. 103; Hoekman and Mavroidis (2007), p. 82.

  22. 22.

    Bacchus (2002), p. 1026.

  23. 23.

    Petersmann (1999), p. 241; WTO, Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration (2004), p. 4.

  24. 24.

    Howse (2016), p. 75.

  25. 25.

    Van den Bossche (2006), p. 292.

  26. 26.

    Von Bogdandy and Venzke (2014), p. 88.

  27. 27.

    Van Den Bossche (2009), p. 113; Yanovich (2007), p. 248; Davey (2008), p. 409; Matsushita (2008), pp. 505 and 523; Matsushita (2012), p. 510; Hughes (2006), p. 193.

  28. 28.

    Ehlermann (2016), p. 29.

  29. 29.

    Davey (2014), p. 690.

  30. 30.

    Crawford and McIntyre (2012), p. 190.

  31. 31.

    Miyagawa (2007), p. 278.

  32. 32.

    See Condon (2018); Gantz (2018), pp. 3 ff; Shaffer et al. (2017a); Kuijper (2017); Marquet (2018); Payosova et al. (2018).

  33. 33.

    Art. 17.5 of the DSU requires reports to be issued in no more than 90 days after appeal.

  34. 34.

    Art. 17.3 of the DSU specifies that members ‘shall not participate in the consideration of any disputes that would create a direct or indirect conflict of interest’.

  35. 35.

    WTO, ‘Appellate Body Members’, <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_descrp_e.htm>.

  36. 36.

    DSU, art. 17.1.

  37. 37.

    Gantz (2018), p. 2.

  38. 38.

    Shaffer et al. (2017a), p. 5; Condon (2018), p. 551.

  39. 39.

    Sacerdoti (2017a), p. 123; Shaffer et al. (2017a), p. 5.

  40. 40.

    See, e.g., Payosova et al. (2018), Andersen et al. (2017), Bacchus (2018) and Raina (2018).

  41. 41.

    DSU, article 17.3.

  42. 42.

    The Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that its members ‘shall be bound, unless they are on leave or prevented from attending by illness or other serious reasons duly explained to the President, to hold themselves permanently at the disposal of the Court.’ This results from the fact that the court is permanently in session, except during the judicial vacations and periodic leave—Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 23, <http://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute>.

  43. 43.

    Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, <https://www.icc-cpi.int/resourcelibrary/official-journal/rome-statute.aspx>.

  44. 44.

    Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, <https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/basic_texts/statute_en.pdf>.

  45. 45.

    Van den Bossch (2005), p. 66; Van den Bossche (2006), p. 297.

  46. 46.

    Van den Bossch (2005), p. 66; Van den Bossche (2006), p. 297.

  47. 47.

    Decision of the DSB of 10 February 1995. See also Preparatory Committee for the World Trade Organization, Sub-Committee on Institutional, Procedural and Legal Matters, Establishment of the Appellate Body: Recommendations by the Preparatory Committee to the WTO approved on 6 December, PC/IPL/13, of 8 December 1994.

  48. 48.

    Decision of the DSB of 10 February 1995, para 10.

  49. 49.

    Decision of the DSB of 10 February 1995, para 11. Footnotes omitted.

  50. 50.

    WTO, Working Procedures for Appellate Review (WT/AB/WP/6), of 16 August 2010.

  51. 51.

    WTO, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, art. 2(2).

  52. 52.

    Walter (2006), p. 450.

  53. 53.

    Steger and Hainsworth (1998), p. 207.

  54. 54.

    WTO, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, art. 2(4).

  55. 55.

    Van den Bossch (2005), p. 67; Van den Bossche (2006), p. 299.

  56. 56.

    Sacerdoti (2006a), p. 43; Sacerdoti (2006b), p. 59.

  57. 57.

    Terris et al. (2007), p. 53.

  58. 58.

    Mackenzie and Sands (2003), p. 283.

  59. 59.

    Steger (1996), p. 325; Steger and Hainsworth (1998), p. 203.

  60. 60.

    Wofford (2000), pp. 564 and 591; Conti (2011), p. 65.

  61. 61.

    Jackson (1998), p. 173.

  62. 62.

    Lowenfeld (2008), p. 179.

  63. 63.

    Terris et al. (2007), p. 106; Shaffer et al. (2016), pp. 245–246; Graham (2016), pp. 3–4.

  64. 64.

    Terris et al. (2007), p. 106.

  65. 65.

    United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2003b), p. 5; Hughes (2009), p. 282; Sacerdoti (2006a), p. 43; Sacerdoti (2006b), p. 59; Venzke (2012), p. 193; Van den Bossche and Zdouc (2013), p. 232, fn. 421; Van den Bossche (2006), p. 299.

  66. 66.

    Bernal et al. (1998), p. 879.

  67. 67.

    Ehlermann (2004), p. 503.

  68. 68.

    Bernal et al. (1998), p. 875; Petersmann (1998), p. 39; Hudec (1999), p. 28; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2003b), p. 5; Hughes (2005a), p. 84; Mavroidis and Van der Borght (2006), p. 206; Lowenfeld (2008), p. 179; Van den Bossche and Zdouc (2013), p. 232; Steger (2015), p. 454; Pauwelyn (2015), pp. 790–791.

  69. 69.

    Donaldson (2005), p. 1288, fn. 60; Petersmann (1998), p. 28; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2003b), p. 5; Hughes (2005a), p. 84; Mavroidis and Van der Borght (2006), p. 206; Lowenfeld (2008), p. 179; Van den Bossche and Zdouc (2013), p. 232; Steger (2015), p. 454; Pauwelyn (2015), pp. 790–791.

  70. 70.

    United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2003b), p. 5.

  71. 71.

    Bernal et al. (1998), p. 875.

  72. 72.

    Hughes (2005a), p. 84; Hughes (2009), p. 282; Pauwelyn (2015), pp. 790–791; Graham (2016), p. 4; Amerasinghe (2009), p. 520; WTO (2017), p. 33; Graham (2013), p. 4; Hughes (2008), p. 494.

  73. 73.

    WTO, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, art. 2(2).

  74. 74.

    Mavroidis and Van der Borght (2006), p. 207.

  75. 75.

    Mavroidis and Van der Borght (2006), p. 207, fn. 24.

  76. 76.

    Nader (1994), p. A12; Shell (1995), p. 850, fn. 99.

  77. 77.

    DSU, art. 17.3.

  78. 78.

    WTO, Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (WT/AB/WP/6), annex II, of 16 August 2010. According to the preamble, the goal of the Rules of Conduct is to strengthen the operation of the DSU by rules of conduct ‘designed to maintain the integrity, impartiality and confidentiality of proceedings conducted under the DSU thereby enhancing confidence in the new dispute settlement mechanism’. In an annex, the Rules contain an illustrative list of information to be disclosed, which includes ‘professional interests (e.g. a past or present relationship with private clients, or any interests the person may have in domestic or international proceedings, and their implications, where these involve issues similar to those addressed in the dispute in question)’. On the Rules, see Marceau (1998); Renouf (2005), pp. 120–127; Donaldson (2005), pp. 1307–1308.

  79. 79.

    See WTO, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, art. 9(1), and WTO, Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, article VI:4(b)(i). The disclosure form reads: ‘I have read the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) and the Rules of Conduct for the DSU. I understand my continuing duty, while participating in the dispute settlement mechanism, and until such time as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) makes a decision on adoption of a report relating to the proceeding or notes its settlement, to disclose herewith and in future any information likely to affect my independence or impartiality, or which could give rise to justifiable doubts as to the integrity and impartiality of the dispute settlement mechanism; and to respect my obligations regarding the confidentiality of dispute settlement proceedings.’—Annex 3 to the Working Procedures for Appellate Review.

  80. 80.

    Mavroidis and Van der Borght (2006), p. 207.

  81. 81.

    Mackenzie and Sands (2003), p. 281; Davey (2003), pp. 180–181; Pauwelyn (2015), p. 780, fn. 120.

  82. 82.

    Mackenzie and Sands (2003), p. 283.

  83. 83.

    As stated by the United States in its 2009 proposal to move members of the Appellate Body into a full-time regime, ‘[a]nother problem with the part-time status of Appellate Body members is that it allows for, and may even require, Appellate Body members to engage in other paid employment. Attempting to retain other employment while being an Appellate Body member raises the possibility of conflicts of interest; it is not in the interests of WTO Members to increase the possibility of an inadvertent conflict of interest presenting itself in the course, or after conclusion, of an appeal.’—see Dispute Settlement Body, Improvements for the WTO Appellate Body—Proposal by the United States, WT/DSB/W/398, of 16 January 2009, p. 2.

  84. 84.

    Mackenzie and Sands (2003), p. 283.

  85. 85.

    The Principles were drafted between 2002 and 2004 by the International Law Association (ILA) Study Group on the Practice and Procedure of International Tribunals in collaboration with the Project on International Courts and Tribunals and the Centre on International Courts and Tribunals, University College of London. The Principles are published as an annex to Sands et al. (2005), pp. 251 ff.

  86. 86.

    Sands et al. (2005), p. 249.

  87. 87.

    The preamble to the Burgh House Principles on the Independence of the International Judiciary notes that ‘each court or tribunal has its own characteristics and functions and that in certain instances judges serve on a part-time basis or as ad hoc or ad litem judges (…)’. Therefore, the Principles ‘shall apply primarily to standing international courts and tribunals (…) and to full-time judges. The Principles should also be applied as appropriate to judges ad hoc, judges ad litem and part-time judges, to international arbitral proceedings and to other exercises of international judicial power.’—Burgh House Principles on the Independence of the International Judiciary. See also Sands et al. (2005), p. 249.

  88. 88.

    Sands et al. (2005), p. 249.

  89. 89.

    Burgh House Principles on the Independence of the International Judiciary, art. 8(1).

  90. 90.

    International Bar Association’s Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence, <https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=bb019013-52b1-427c-ad25-a6409b49fe29>.

  91. 91.

    International Bar Association’s Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence, §25.

  92. 92.

    Montreal Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, unanimously adopted at the final plenary session of the First World Conference on the Independence of Justice held at Montreal (Quebec, Canada) on 10 June 1983, <https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Montreal-Declaration.pdf>.

  93. 93.

    Montreal Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, §2.20.

  94. 94.

    Montreal Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, §2.20.

  95. 95.

    Montreal Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, §2.20.

  96. 96.

    Olbourne (2003), p. 123.

  97. 97.

    Sands et al. (2005), p. 249.

  98. 98.

    Crawford and McIntyre (2012), p. 198.

  99. 99.

    Brown (2003), p. 96.

  100. 100.

    Crawford and McIntyre (2012), p. 191.

  101. 101.

    Van den Bossche (2006), p. 300.

  102. 102.

    Decision of the DSB of 10 February 1995, para 11.

  103. 103.

    Graham (2016), p. 4.

  104. 104.

    Lowenfeld (1994), p. 484.

  105. 105.

    Hughes (2008), p. 495; Hughes (2005b), p. 31.

  106. 106.

    Steger (2004), p. 45; Office of the United States Trade Representative, WTO Appoint US Trade Scholar to WTO Appellate Body, 7 November 2003, <https://ustr.gov/archive/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2003/November/WTO_Appoints_US_Trade_Scholar_to_WTO_Appellate_Body.html>; Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Proposes WTO Appellate Body Reforms (2009), <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2009/january/us-proposes-wto-appellate-body-reforms>.

  107. 107.

    Hughes (2008), p. 495.

  108. 108.

    Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Proposes WTO Appellate Body Reforms (2009).

  109. 109.

    Hughes (2008), p. 494.

  110. 110.

    Hughes (2008), pp. 494–495.

  111. 111.

    Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of the Meeting held in the Centre William Rappard on 12 March 2001, WT/DSB/M/101, of 8 May 2001, p. 25, para 119.

  112. 112.

    Mavroidis and Van der Borght (2006), p. 206.

  113. 113.

    Mavroidis and Van der Borght (2006), p. 206.

  114. 114.

    Messenger (2016a), p. 129.

  115. 115.

    Messenger (2016b), p. 54, fn. 42.

  116. 116.

    Weiler (2002), p. 190; Hughes (2008), p. 491; Ghias (2006), p. 542; Terris et al. (2007), p. 270, fn. 7; Elsig and Pollack (2014), p. 402; Shaffer et al. (2016), pp. 237 and 246; Messenger (2016b), p. 54; Shaffer et al. (2017b), p. 280; Messenger (2016a), p. 129; McRae (2004), p. 7.

  117. 117.

    Messenger (2016a), p. 129; Montana I Mora (1993), p. 144; Messenger (2016b), p. 54.

  118. 118.

    Ghias (2006), p. 542.

  119. 119.

    Petersmann (2014), p. 659; Ghias (2006), p. 542; Terris et al. (2007), p. 270, fn. 7; Elsig and Pollack (2014), p. 402; Shaffer et al. (2017b), p. 246; Messenger (2016b), p. 54; Shaffer et al. (2017b), p. 280; Hughes (2008), p. 491.

  120. 120.

    Ghias (2006), p. 542.

  121. 121.

    Ghias (2006), p. 542; Terris et al. (2007), p. 270, fn. 7; Elsig and Pollack (2014), p. 402; Messenger (2016b), p. 54; Kolsky Lewis (2006), p. 911; McRae (2004), p. 7; Hughes (2008), p. 491.

  122. 122.

    Terris et al. (2007), p. 270, fn. 7.

  123. 123.

    Terris et al. (2007), p. 270, fn. 7.

  124. 124.

    Van den Bossch (2005), p. 67; Van den Bossche (2006), pp. 294 and 300.

  125. 125.

    Van den Bossch (2005), p. 65; Van den Bossche (2006), p. 294.

  126. 126.

    Van den Bossch (2005), p. 65; Van den Bossche (2006), p. 294.

  127. 127.

    Mavroidis et al. (2010), p. 1024, fn. 1.

  128. 128.

    See Elsig and Pollack (2014), p. 402.

  129. 129.

    Shaffer et al. (2016), p. 237.

  130. 130.

    Shany (2014), p. 146, fn. 40.

  131. 131.

    Montana I Mora (1993), p. 144.

  132. 132.

    Kolsky Lewis (2006), p. 911.

  133. 133.

    Weiler (2002), p. 190.

  134. 134.

    Weiler (2002), p. 190.

  135. 135.

    Shaffer et al. (2017b), p. 277.

  136. 136.

    Sacerdoti (2006b), p. 67; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2003a), p. 49; Van den Bossche and Zdouc (2013), p. 205.

  137. 137.

    Young (1995), p. 403; Montana I Mora (1993), p. 151; Elsig and Eckhardt (2015), p. 14.

  138. 138.

    Dillon Jr. (1995), p. 379.

  139. 139.

    Charnovitz (2015), p. 99; Montana I Mora (1993), p. 144; Baudenbacher (2004), p. 394.

  140. 140.

    McRae (2004), p. 7.

  141. 141.

    Ghias (2006), p. 542.

  142. 142.

    Weiler (2002), p. 191.

  143. 143.

    Janow (2008), pp. 250 and 255; Montana I Mora (1993), p. 144; Sacerdoti (2006b), p. 52; Romano (1999), p. 719.

  144. 144.

    Ghias (2006), p. 542.

  145. 145.

    Litvak (1995), p. 583.

  146. 146.

    Von Bogdandy and Venzke (2013), p. 162, fn 1.

  147. 147.

    Howse (2016), p. 12.

  148. 148.

    Howse (2016), p. 12.

  149. 149.

    United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2003a), p. 49.

  150. 150.

    Reitz (1996), p. 583.

  151. 151.

    Kelly (2002), pp. 353–354.

  152. 152.

    Howse (2003), p. 11.

  153. 153.

    Ghias (2006), p. 553.

  154. 154.

    Howse (2003), p. 11.

  155. 155.

    Shoyer and Forton (1998), p. 740; Weiler (2002), p. 188.

  156. 156.

    Broude (2004), p. 133.

  157. 157.

    Shaffer et al. (2016), p. 238; Ghias (2006), p. 535; Ehlermann (2004), p. 500.

  158. 158.

    Mavroidis (2013), p. 107.

  159. 159.

    Porges (2003), p. 141.

  160. 160.

    Ehlermann (2004), p. 599; Van den Bossch (2005), p. 64; Van den Bossche (2006), p. 289; Ragosta et al. (2003), p. 697.

  161. 161.

    Evans (2000), p. 47.

  162. 162.

    Kolsky Lewis (2006), p. 911.

  163. 163.

    Mavroidis et al. (2010), p. 881.

  164. 164.

    Graham (2013), p. 2.

  165. 165.

    Lawrence (2007), p. 7; Abi-Saab (2005), p. 10.

  166. 166.

    Vermulst and Graafsma (2002), p. 43, fn. 89.

  167. 167.

    Gaffney (1999), p. 1191.

  168. 168.

    Steger (2002), p. 482; Smith (2003), p. 66; Ehlermann (2003), p. 470; Hughes (2008), p. 491.

  169. 169.

    Ehlermann (2003), pp. 470 and 478; Graham (2017), p. 113; Graham (2016), p. 3; Petersmann (2007), p. 87.

  170. 170.

    Ehlermann (2003), p. 479; Petersmann (2007), p. 87.

  171. 171.

    Ehring (2008), p. 1029.

  172. 172.

    Gaffney (1999), p. 1182.

  173. 173.

    Ruiz Fabri (2009), p. 155.

  174. 174.

    Hughes (2008), p. 492.

  175. 175.

    Ehlermann (2004), p. 500; Kolsky Lewis (2006), p. 911; Venzke (2013), p. 249.

  176. 176.

    Van Damme (2010), p. 606; Van Damme (2009), pp. 7 and 156 ff; Abi-Saab (2006), pp. 455–456; Mitchell (2007), p. 829; Ghias (2006), p. 542; McRae (2004), p. 7.

  177. 177.

    McRae (2004), p. 7.

  178. 178.

    Van Damme (2009), p. 210.

  179. 179.

    See, e.g., Kelly (2002), pp. 353 and 369; Esserman and Howse (2003), passim; Wofford (2000), p. 567; Mavroidis (2014), p. 243; Mavroidis (2013), p. 103; Mavroidis (2009), passim; Mavroidis (2008), passim.

  180. 180.

    Bacchus (2002), p. 1024; Graham (2013), pp. 2 and 11; Graham (2017), p. 113; Graham (2016), p. 3.

  181. 181.

    Baudenbacher (2004), p. 394; Gaffney (1999), p. 1182.

  182. 182.

    Shaffer et al. (2016), p. 246.

  183. 183.

    Terris et al. (2007), p. 106.

  184. 184.

    Evans and de Tarso Pereira (2005), p. 266.

  185. 185.

    See, e.g., Broude (2004), p. 343; Ostry (2000), p. 108; Sacerdoti (2017b), p. 147; Footer (2006), p. 1; Elsig and Eckhardt (2015), p. 14; Ragosta et al. (2003), p. 697; Wolff (1998), p. 951.

  186. 186.

    Jackson (2007), p. 31.

  187. 187.

    Shaffer et al. (2016), p. 238.

  188. 188.

    Hughes (2007), p. 186.

  189. 189.

    See, for example, Petersmann (1999), p. 241.

  190. 190.

    Zimmermann (2005), p. 36.

  191. 191.

    See, e.g., Mann et al. (2004), p. 14; Laird (2016), p. 115; Howse (2016), p. 77; Huber and Tereposky (2017), p. 591; Katz (2016), p. 163; McRae (2010), p. 376.

  192. 192.

    Sacerdoti (2017b), p. 147. See European Commission (2015): ‘[t]he judges would have very high technical and legal qualifications, comparable to those required for the members of permanent international courts such as the International Court of Justice and the WTO Appellate Body. (…) The members of the Appeal Tribunal under TTIP would be subject to: stringent qualifications comparable to those required for the members of permanent international courts such as the International Court of Justice and the WTO Appellate Body; strict ethical requirements; a remuneration system based on that of the WTO Appellate Body (a monthly retainer fee and fees for days worked)’.

  193. 193.

    Howse (2016), p. 77.

  194. 194.

    Schoenbaum (1998), p. 658.

  195. 195.

    Steger (2004), p. 45.

  196. 196.

    Dunoff (2002), p. 198.

  197. 197.

    Shaffer (2009), p. 169.

  198. 198.

    Smith (2003), p. 66.

  199. 199.

    Van den Bossch (2005), p. 64; Van den Bossche (2006), p. 289; Weiler (2002), p. 191.

  200. 200.

    Gal-Or (2008), p. 57.

  201. 201.

    Taniguchi (2009), p. 21.

  202. 202.

    Weiler (2002), p. 190.

  203. 203.

    Gal-Or (2008), p. 58. See Vagts (1996).

  204. 204.

    Taniguchi (2009), p. 21.

  205. 205.

    Davey (2014), p. 693.

  206. 206.

    Renouf (2005), pp. 116–117.

  207. 207.

    Mavroidis (2008), p. 367.

  208. 208.

    Mavroidis (2008), p. 367.

  209. 209.

    Suami (2009), p. 182.

  210. 210.

    Porges (2003), p. 141.

  211. 211.

    McRae (2004), p. 8.

  212. 212.

    Wald (2008), p. 683.

  213. 213.

    See European Commission (2016).

  214. 214.

    European Commission (2017a), p. 2.

  215. 215.

    European Commission (2017b), p. 3, para 7.

  216. 216.

    Hudec (1999), p. 3. ‘This arrangement could be kept under review by the DSB, and considered at the latest at the first Ministerial Conference, to determine whether a move to full-time employment was warranted.’—Decision of the DSB of 10 February 1995, para 11.

  217. 217.

    Hughes (2006), p. 218.

  218. 218.

    Ehlermann (2004), p. 503.

  219. 219.

    Sutherland et al. (2004), p. 56, para 254.

  220. 220.

    Evans and de Tarso Pereira (2005), p. 267.

  221. 221.

    Petersmann (2007), p. 40.

  222. 222.

    Bernauer et al. (2012), p. 502.

  223. 223.

    Sacerdoti (2006a), p. 55; Sacerdoti (2006b), p. 71.

  224. 224.

    Hudec (1998), p. 120; Shaffer et al. (2016), p. 237.

  225. 225.

    Chen (1995), p. 1329.

  226. 226.

    Ehring (2008), p. 1029.

  227. 227.

    Decision of the DSB of 10 February 1995, para 4.

  228. 228.

    Wha Chang (2017), p. 105.

  229. 229.

    Matsushita (2015), p. 549.

  230. 230.

    Matsushita (2015), p. 549.

  231. 231.

    Janow (2008), p. 252.

  232. 232.

    Steger (2004), p. 46.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, PR China

    Fernando Dias Simões

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  1. Fernando Dias Simões
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Law, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany

    Marc Bungenberg

  2. Faculty of Law, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Erlangen, Germany

    Markus Krajewski

  3. School of Law, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

    Christian J. Tams

  4. Competition and Regulation Institute, Leuphana University Lüneburg, Lüneburg, Germany

    Jörg Philipp Terhechte

  5. Faculty of Law and Criminal Sciences, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland

    Andreas R. Ziegler

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Simões, F.D. (2019). The Appellate Body of the WTO: An International Court by Another Name. In: Bungenberg, M., Krajewski, M., Tams, C.J., Terhechte, J.P., Ziegler, A.R. (eds) European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2019. European Yearbook of International Economic Law, vol 10. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/8165_2019_33

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