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Negotiations with Asymmetrical Distribution of Power pp 129–171Cite as

Alternative Dispute Resolution enables efficient negotiations

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Part of the Contributions to Economics book series (CE)

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References

  1. The authors of ‘Getting to Yes’ (Fisher/ Ury/ Patton, 1991) are also the founders of the so-called ‘Harvard Negotiation Project’ which stands for interest-based/principled negotiations. I have chosen to use the term ‘Harvard Negotiation Project’ in this study to reflect the whole idea and not just to focus on one aspect of it.

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  237. See Racine/ Winkler, 2002.

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  238. This paragraph builds on Märker/ Trénel, 2003. An example of the use of online mediation is the report from Euro-Info-Verbraucher e.V., 2005. It shows that the use of online mediation instruments is suitable especially for online (network) markets.

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© 2006 Physica-Verlag Heidelberg

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(2006). Alternative Dispute Resolution enables efficient negotiations. In: Negotiations with Asymmetrical Distribution of Power. Contributions to Economics. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-7908-1744-9_4

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