Abstract
The classical AGM account (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson [1985]) of belief revision is an account of the process of changing sets of beliefs by either adding beliefs consistent with a belief set (expansion), or giving up beliefs (contraction). The AGM account is built on the notion of classically consistent theories which are closed under deductive consequence and include all the theorems of their base logic. We present an account of belief sets and belief change in terms of model-sets (Hintikka [1969]) and tableaux with flagged formulas. The account is four valued rather than two valued, and uses the values true, not true, false and not false. These are “believed” values. The account allows for paraconsistency. We draw on the semi-classical logics around RM (Dunn [1976]). The use of flagged formulas allows for a more subtle approach to both expansion and contraction.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Alchourrón, C.E., P. Gärdenfors, and D. Makinson. 1985. “On the logic of Theory Change: Partial meet functions for contraction and revision.” Journal of Symbolic Logic 50: 510–530
Dunn, J.M. 1976. “A Kripke-Style Semantics for R-Mingle Using a Binary Accessibility Relation”, Studia Logica, 35, 163–172.
Gärdenfors, P. 1988. Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Girle, R.A. 1982 “Semantic Tableau for Logics around RM”, Australian Logic Teachers' Journal, 6(3), 1–20.
Girle, R.A. 1989a “Logic Programming with Semi-classical Model-set Semantics”, Ninth International Workshop Expert Systems and their Applications, General Conference, Volume 1, Avignon, May 29–June 2, 101–114.
Girle, R.A. 1989b. “Computational Models for Knowledge”, Proceedings of the Australian Joint Artificial Intelligence Conference, Melbourne, Vic, Nov. 14–17, 104–119
Girle, R.A. 1992. “Inconsistent Belief and Logic” in Advances in Artificial Intelligence Research, Vol 2, Eds. Fishman, M.B. and J.L. Robards, JAI Press, London, 23–36.
Girle, R.A. 1995. “Tolerating Contradiction in Knowledge Representation”, Proceedings of the Eighth Florida Artificial Intelligence Research Symposium, Melbourne, Florida, April 27–29, 1–5.
Hintikka, J.K. 1969. Models for Modalities, Reidel, Dordrecht.
Hocutt, M.O. 1972. “Is Epistemic Logic possible?”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 13 (4), 433–453
Jaspars, Jan. O. M. 1995. “Partial Up and Down Logic”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 36 (1), 134–157
van Bentham, J. 1988. A Manual of Intensional Logic 2nd Ed. Revised and Expanded, CSLI, Stanford.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Girle, R.A. (1996). Tableaux for expansion and contraction. In: Foo, N., Goebel, R. (eds) PRICAI'96: Topics in Artificial Intelligence. PRICAI 1996. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1114. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-61532-6_33
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-61532-6_33
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-61532-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-68729-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive