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A case study on the formal development of a reactor safety system

  • Terje Sivertsen
Invited Lectures
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1051)

Abstract

The EvalFM project was initiated in order to investigate the applicability of formal methods in the development of safety-critical software-based systems. The overall goal was to explore the strengths and limitations of these methods through practical experience on a realistic example. The present paper presents the main results from the project, related to a case study on the applicability of algebraic specification in the development of a reactor safety system.

Keywords

Formal Method Requirement Document Abstract Syntax Tree Algebraic Specification Alarm Limit 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Terje Sivertsen
    • 1
  1. 1.OECD Halden Reactor ProjectInstitute for Energy TechnologyHaldenNorway

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