Learn your opponent's strategy (in polynomial time)!

  • Yishay Mor
  • Claudia V. Goldman
  • Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
Workshop Contributions
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1042)

Abstract

Agents that interact in a distributed environment might increase their utility by behaving optimally given the strategies of the other agents. To do so, agents need to learn about those with whom they share the same world.

This paper examines interactions among agents from a game theoretic perspective. In this context, learning has been assumed as a means to reach equilibrium. We analyze the complexity of this learning process. We start with a restricted two-agent model, in which agents are represented by finite automata, and one of the agents plays a fixed strategy. We show that even with this restrictions, the learning process may be exponential in time.

We then suggest a criterion of simplicity, that induces a class of automata that are learnable in polynomial time.

Keywords

Distributed Artificial Intelligence Learning repeated games automata 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yishay Mor
    • 1
  • Claudia V. Goldman
    • 1
  • Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
    • 1
  1. 1.Computer Science DepartmentHebrew UniversityJerusalemIsrael

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