A framework for dealing with belief-goal dynamics
This paper illustrates the Goal Dynamics theory, a proposal for dealing with some crucial aspects of “goal revision”, bas belief revision, one of the most fundamental aspects in a cognitive agent architecture. The theory concerns the relationships between beliefs, goals and intention; moreover it shows the different forms that goals and intentions can assume according to the status of their supporting beliefs. Since beliefs support goals and intentions in the various phases of their processing, it is possible demonstrate how the acquisition or the elimination of beliefs brings to goal activation—and then to actuate the intention—or their suspension or withdrawal.
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