Advertisement

The dynamics of default reasoning

Extended abstract
  • B. van Linder
  • W. van der Hoek
  • J. -J. Ch. Meyer
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 946)

Abstract

In this paper we look at default reasoning from a dynamic, agent-oriented, point of view. We introduce actions that model the (attempted) jumping to conclusions which is a fundamental part of reasoning by default. Application of such an action consists of three parts. First it is checked whether the formula that the agent tries to jump to is a default, thereafter it is checked whether the default formula can consistently be incorporated by the agent, and if this is the case the formula is included in the agent's beliefs. We define the ability and opportunity of agents to apply these actions, and the states of affairs following application. To formalize formulae being defaults, we introduce the modality of common possibility. To model the qualitative difference that exists between hard, factual knowledge and beliefs derived by default, we employ different modalities to represent these concepts, thus combining knowledge, beliefs, and defaults within one framework.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    P. Cohen and H. Levesque. Intention is ... AI, 42:213–261, 1990.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    J. Halpern and Y. Moses. A guide to completeness and complexity for modal logics of knowledge and belief. AI, 54:319–379, 1992.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    J. Hintikka. Knowledge and Belief. Cornell University Press, 1962.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    W. van der Hoek, B. van Linder, and J.-J. Meyer. A logic of capabilities. In Nerode and Matiyasevich, eds., Procs. of LFCS'94, LNCS 813, pp. 366–378.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    W. van der Hoek, B. van Linder, and J.-J. Ch. Meyer. Unravelling nondeterminism. In Jorrand and Sgurev, eds., Proceedings of AIMSA'94, pp. 163–172.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    S. Kraus and D. Lehmann. Knowledge, belief and time. TCS, 58:155–174, 1988.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    B. van Linder, W. van der Hoek, and J.-J. Meyer. Actions that Make you Change your Mind. TR UU-CS-1994-53.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    B. van Linder, W. van der Hoek, and J.-J. Meyer. Communicating rational agents. In Nebel and Dreschler-Fischer, eds., Proceedings of KI-94, LNCS 861, pp. 202–213.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    B. van Linder, W. van der Hoek, and J.-J. Meyer. The dynamics of default reasoning. TR UU-CS-1994-48.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    B. van Linder, W. van der Hoek, and J.-J. Meyer. Tests as epistemic updates. In Cohn, ed., Proceedings of ECAI'94, pp. 331–335. John Wiley & Sons, 1994.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    B. van Linder, W. van der Hoek, and J.-J. Meyer. Seeing is Believing. TR UU-CS-1995-08.Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    V.W. Marek and M. Truszczyński. Nonmonotonic Logic. Springer-Verlag, 1993.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    R. Moore. Reasoning about knowledge and action. TR 191, SRI, 1980.Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    R. Reiter. A logic for default reasoning. AI, 13:81–132, 1980.Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    G.H. von Wright. Norm and Action. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • B. van Linder
    • 1
  • W. van der Hoek
    • 1
  • J. -J. Ch. Meyer
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUtrecht UniversityTB UtrechtThe Netherlands

Personalised recommendations