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The Rampart toolkit for building high-integrity services

  • Michael K. Reiter
Group Communication
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 938)

Abstract

Rampart is a toolkit of protocols to facilitate the development of high-integrity services, i.e., distributed services that retain their availability and correctness despite the malicious penetration of some component servers by an attacker. At the core of Rampart are new protocols that solve several basic problems in distributed computing, including asynchronous group membership, reliable multicast (Byzantine agreement), and atomic multicast. Using these protocols, Rampart supports the development of high-integrity services via the technique of state machine replication, and also extends this technique with a new approach to server output voting. In this paper we give a brief overview of Rampart, focusing primarily on its protocol architecture. We also sketch its performance in our prototype implementation and ongoing work.

Keywords

Group Multicast Multicast Protocol Group View Correct Server Byzantine Agreement 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael K. Reiter
    • 1
  1. 1.AT&T Bell LaboratoriesHolmdelUSA

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