Abstract
One of the basic problems of theoretical political science is whether cooperation will ensue in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Unfortunately, analytical game theory cannot be expected to solve this problem. An experimental approach by Axelrod has been tried out, suggesting the robustness of the renowned TIT FOR TAT strategy. However, this strategy only works in some environments and falters when occasional misunderstandings are possible.
In this article I simulate an artificial world of artificial individuals, facing a multitude of Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas. The ones who do well survive, the others change their strategies. This simple dynamic approach reveals a surprising efficiency: Even for substantial amounts of misunderstanding the simulations do very well — and better than TIT FOR TAT.
The uncoerced cooperation that evolves is unexpectedly stable because it is composed of many different strategies, making it hard for any single contender to beat everyone. Such models provide a powerful metaphor for a pluralist society.
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© 1994 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Lomborg, B. (1994). Game theory vs. multiple agents: The iterated prisoner's dilemma. In: Castelfranchi, C., Werner, E. (eds) Artificial Social Systems. MAAMAW 1992. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 830. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-58266-5_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-58266-5_5
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