Extended majority voting and private-key algebraic-code encryptions
In this paper, a private-key cryptosystem equivalent to the private-key cryptosystem proposed by Rao and Nam is analyzed. The main result is that the private-key cryptosystem is vulnerable to a so-called extended majority vote attack. This attack can be averted if one selects the predefined set of error vectors at random. As a consequence, the error vector generating process will become much easier.
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