Advertisement

A note on Chapman's Modal Truth Criterion

  • Maria Fox
  • Derek Long
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 727)

Abstract

The formal statement of the Modal Truth Criterion presented by Chapman [1] is shown not to be necessary, in contradiction of Chapman's original claim that the criterion is both necessary and sufficient. This is achieved through the presentation of a counter-example which is a partial plan in which a goal is necessarily true, and yet fails to satisfy Chapman's criterion. A corollary of this result is that the validity checking problem for partial plans, claimed by Chapman to be polynomially solvable, is now open.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Chapman, D.: Planning for conjunctive goals. Artificial Intelligence 29 (1987) 333–377Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Fox, M., Long, D.: A re-examination of the modal truth criterion for non-linear planners. Research Note, University College London, (1992).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Maria Fox
    • 1
  • Derek Long
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity College LondonLondon

Personalised recommendations