Authentication codes with perfect protection
In this paper we prove new results on authentication codes with perfect protection. We will prove that perfect protection for impersonation follows from perfect protection for substitution only if the source is uniform and derive a necessary and sufficient condition for codes that provide perfect protection for both types of attack. We prove a new lower bound on the probability of deception in substitution for codes with perfect protection and characterize the codes that satisfy the bound with equality.
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