Abstract
In [LW91], Li and Wang proposed a joint authentication and encryption scheme based on algebraic coding theory. They claimed that their scheme is as secure as the Rao-Nam scheme [RN89]. However, in contrast with their claim, it will be shown that this joint authentication and encryption scheme appears to be less secure. In this paper two inherently different chosen-plaintext attacks are presented.
The first attack is based on the linearity of the bit selection function, and obtains a k × n matrix equivalent to the encryption matrix in O(k) encryptions. If the set of error vectors kZ is randomly chosen, about ¦kZ¦ encryptions are necessary to obtain a corresponding set of error vectors. With knowledge of only r error vectors one can always encrypt and decrypt r22k−n messages.
The second attack makes use of the non-linearity of the error function, and always obtains 2k − n rows of the encryption matrix after O(k 2) encryptions. Hereafter ¦kZ¦ encryptions are required to create a cryptosystem equivalent to the Li-Wang scheme.
Some extensions of the scheme are discussed, and a general question raised by Brickell and Odlyzko [BO88] related to the Rao-Nam scheme is settled in a negative way.
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References
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© 1993 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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van Tilburg, J. (1993). Two chosen-plaintext attacks on the Li-Wang joint authentication and encryption scheme. In: Cohen, G., Mora, T., Moreno, O. (eds) Applied Algebra, Algebraic Algorithms and Error-Correcting Codes. AAECC 1993. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 673. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-56686-4_55
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-56686-4_55
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