In a system in which noncooperative agents share a common resource, we propose the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum as a measure of the effectiveness of the system. Deriving upper and lower bounds for this ratio in a model in which several agents share a very simple network leads to some interesting mathematics, results, and open problems.
- Nash Equilibrium
- Pure Strategy
- Initial Load
- Social Optimum
- Identical Link
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Koutsoupias, E., Papadimitriou, C. (1999). Worst-Case Equilibria. In: Meinel, C., Tison, S. (eds) STACS 99. STACS 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1563. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-49116-3_38
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