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On the Existence of Statistically Hiding Bit Commitment Schemes and Fail-Stop Signatures

  • Ivan B. Damgård
  • Torben P. Pedersen
  • Birgit Pfitzmann
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 773)

Abstract

We show that the existence of a statistically hiding bit commitment scheme with non-interactive opening and public verification implies the existence of fail-stop signatures. Therefore such signatures can now be based on any one-way permutation — the weakest assumption known to be sufficient for fail-stop signatures. We also show that genuinely practical fail-stop signatures follow from the existence of any collision-intractable hash function. A similar idea is used to improve a commitment scheme of Naor and Yung, so that one can commit to several bits with amortized O(1) bits of communication per bit committed to.

Conversely, we show that any fail-stop signature scheme with a property we call the almost unique secret key property can be transformed into a statistically hiding bit commitment scheme. All previously known fail-stop signature schemes have this property. We even obtain an equivalence since we can modify the construction of fail-stop signatures from bit commitments such that it has this property.

Keywords

Hash Function Signature Scheme Security Property Security Parameter Commitment Scheme 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ivan B. Damgård
    • 1
  • Torben P. Pedersen
    • 1
  • Birgit Pfitzmann
    • 2
  1. 1.Matematisk InstitutAahus UniversityAarhus CDenmark
  2. 2.Institut für InformatikUniversität HildesheimHildesheimGermany

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