Abstract
A new type of signature scheme, a signature scheme where forgery by an unexpectedly powerful attacker is provable, was suggested in [11]: if the signature of an honest participant Alice is forged, she can prove this forgery with arbitrarily high probability.
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References
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© 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Bleumer, G., Pfitzmann, B., Waidner, M. (1991). A Remark on a Signature Scheme Where Forgery can be Proved. In: Damgård, I.B. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT ’90. EUROCRYPT 1990. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 473. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46877-3_39
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46877-3_39
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