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Extending Wiener’s Attack in the Presence of Many Decrypting Exponents

  • Nicholas Howgrave-Graham
  • Jean-Pierre Seifert
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1740)

Abstract

Wiener has shown that when the RSA protocol is used with a decrypting exponent, d, which is less than N 1/4 and an encrypting exponent, e, approximately the same size as N, then d can usually be found from the continued fraction approximation of e/N. We extend this attack to the case when there are many ei for a given N, all with small d i . For the case of two such e i , the d i can (heuristically) be as large as N 5/14 and still be efficiently recovered. As the number of encrypting exponents increases the bound on the d i , which enables efficient recovery of the d i , increases (slowly) to N 1-∈. However, the complexity of our method is exponential in the number of exponents present, and therefore only practical for a relatively small number of them.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nicholas Howgrave-Graham
    • 1
  • Jean-Pierre Seifert
    • 2
  1. 1.Mathematical Sciences DepartmentUniversity of BathUK
  2. 2.Department of MathematicsJohann Wolfgang Goethe-UniversityFrankfurt am MainGermany

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