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International Conference on Information Security

ISC 2002: Information Security pp 191–199Cite as

Receipt-Free Sealed-Bid Auction

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2433))

Abstract

This paper points out the risk of bid-rigging in electronic sealed-bid auctions and provides a receipt-free sealed-bid auction scheme to prevent it. The scheme enjoys receipt-freeness, secrecy of bidding price and public verifiability and uses a chameleon bit-commitment technique. It requires a bidding booth and a one-way untappable channel from eachbidding boothto eachauctioneer.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. NTT Laboratories, 1-1 Hikari-no-oka, Yokosuka, 239-0847, Kanagawa, Japan

    Masayuki Abe & Koutarou Suzuki

Authors
  1. Masayuki Abe
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  2. Koutarou Suzuki
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. College of Computer Science, Northeastern University, 02115, Boston, MA, USA

    Agnes Hui Chan

  2. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Maryland, 20742, College Park, MD, USA

    Virgil Gligor

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© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Abe, M., Suzuki, K. (2002). Receipt-Free Sealed-Bid Auction. In: Chan, A.H., Gligor, V. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2433. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45811-5_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45811-5_14

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-44270-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45811-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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