Abstract
The Inductive Approach for protocol verification, extended with a formalisation of message reception and agents’ knowledge, is adopted here for reasoning about non-repudiation protocols. The fair non-repudiation protocol due to Zhou and Gollmann is modelled inductively in Isabelle/HOL. The verification focuses on the validity of evidence goal: that the evidence held by each peer at the end of a session suffices to refute the other’s denial of participation. The proof strategies appear to be general thus far, but the fairness goal is yet to be studied.
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Bella, G., Paulson, L.C. (2002). A Proof of Non-repudiation. In: Christianson, B., Malcolm, J.A., Crispo, B., Roe, M. (eds) Security Protocols. Security Protocols 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2467. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45807-7_19
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45807-7_19
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