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Securing “Encryption + Proof of Knowledge” in the Random Oracle Model

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Topics in Cryptology — CT-RSA 2002 (CT-RSA 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2271))

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Abstract

To create encryption schemes that offer security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks, this paper shows how to securely combine a simple encryption scheme with a proof of knowledge made noninteractive with a hash function. A typical example would be combining the ElGamal encryption scheme with the Schnorr signature scheme. While the straightforward combination will fail to provide security in the random oracle model, we present a class of encryption schemes that uses a proof of knowledge where the security can be proven based on the random oracle assumption and the number theoretic assumptions. The resulting schemes are useful as any casual party can be assured of the (in)validity of the ciphertexts.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. NTT Information Sharing Platform Laboratories, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, 1-1 Hikari-no-oka, Yokosuka-shi, 239-0847, Kanagawa-ken, Japan

    Masayuki Abe

Authors
  1. Masayuki Abe
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electrical Engineering, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, 3001, Leuven-Heverlee, Belgium

    Bart Preneel

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Abe, M. (2002). Securing “Encryption + Proof of Knowledge” in the Random Oracle Model. In: Preneel, B. (eds) Topics in Cryptology — CT-RSA 2002. CT-RSA 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2271. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45760-7_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45760-7_19

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-43224-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45760-2

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