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Cryptanalysis of the Hwang-Rao Secret Error-Correcting Code Schemes

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2229))

Abstract

In this paper, the cryptanalytic strength of two Hwang- Rao Secret Error-Correcting Code (SECC) schemes is examined under a known-plaintext attack. In particular, we found the existence of key information redundancy in all SECCs used in the electronic codebook (ECB) mode. Also, our investigations indicate the existence of synergism in the SECC schemes, that is, the security of SECC (containing three transformations, Ψ and E and P) is much stronger than the individual strength of either Ψ or E or P.

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© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Zeng, K., Yang, CH., Rao, T. (2001). Cryptanalysis of the Hwang-Rao Secret Error-Correcting Code Schemes. In: Qing, S., Okamoto, T., Zhou, J. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2229. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45600-7_46

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45600-7_46

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-42880-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45600-1

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