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Analysis of Paris Metro Pricing Strategy for QoS with a Single Service Provider

  • Ravi Jain
  • Tracy Mullen
  • Robert Hausman
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2092)

Abstract

As the diversity ofI nternet applications increases, so does the need for a variety of quality-of-service (QoS) levels on the network. The Paris Metro Pricing (PMP) strategy uses pricing as a tool to implement network resource allocation for QoS assurance; PMP is simple, self-regulating, and does not require significant communications or bandwidth overhead. In this paper, we develop an analytic model for PMP. We first assume that the network service provider is a single constrained monopolist and users must participate in the network; we model the resultant consumer behavior and the provider’s profit. We then relax the restriction that users must join the network, allowing them to opt-out, and derive the critical QoS thresholds for a profit-maximizing service provider. Our results show that PMP in a single-provider scenario can be profitable to the provider, both when users must use the system and when they may opt out.

Keywords

Mobile Host Network Service Provider Wireless Application Protocol Network Resource Allocation Single Service Provider 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ravi Jain
    • 1
  • Tracy Mullen
    • 1
  • Robert Hausman
    • 1
  1. 1.Telcordia TechnologiesMorristownUSA

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