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A New Logic for Electronic Commerce Protocols

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Algebraic Methodology and Software Technology (AMAST 2000)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 1816))

Abstract

The primary objective of this paper is to present the definition of a new dynamic, linear and modal logic for security protocols. The logic is compact, expressive and formal. It allows the specification of classical security properties (authentication, secrecy and integrity) and also electronic commerce properties (non-repudiation, anonymity, good atomicity, money atomicity, certified delivery, etc.). The logic constructs are interpreted over a trace-based model. Traces reflect valid protocol executions in the presence of a malicious smart intruder. The logic is endowed with a tableau-based proof system that leads to a modular denotational semantics.

This research is supported by a research grant from the National and Science Engineering Council, NSERC, and the Fonds pour la formation de Chercheurs et l’Aide à la Recherche, FCAR.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. LSFM Research Group, Computer Science Department, Laval University, Quebec, Canada

    Kamel Adi, Mourad Debbabi & Mohamed Mejri

Authors
  1. Kamel Adi
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  2. Mourad Debbabi
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  3. Mohamed Mejri
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, The University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, 52242, USA

    Teodor Rus

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© 2000 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Adi, K., Debbabi, M., Mejri, M. (2000). A New Logic for Electronic Commerce Protocols. In: Rus, T. (eds) Algebraic Methodology and Software Technology. AMAST 2000. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1816. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45499-3_35

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45499-3_35

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-67530-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45499-1

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