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A Proof System for Information Flow Security

  • Annalisa Bossi
  • Riccardo Focardi
  • Carla Piazza
  • Sabina Rossi
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2664)

Abstract

Persistent_BNDC (P_BNDC, for short) is an information-flow security property for processes in dynamic contexts, i.e., contexts that can be reconfigured at runtime. Intuitively, P_BNDC requires that high level interactions never interfere with the low level behavior of the system, in every possible state. P_BNDC is verified by checking whether the system interacting with a high level component is bisimilar or not to the system in isolation. In this work we contribute to the verification of information-flow security in two respects: (i) we give an unwinding condition that allows us to express P_BNDC in terms of a local property on high level actions and (ii) we exploit this local property in order to define a proof system which provides a very efficient technique for the development and the verification of P_BNDC processes.

Keywords

Proof System Security Property High Level Action Label Transition System Access Read 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Annalisa Bossi
    • 1
  • Riccardo Focardi
    • 1
  • Carla Piazza
    • 1
  • Sabina Rossi
    • 1
  1. 1.Dipartimento di InformaticaUniversità Ca’ Foscari di VeneziaItaly

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