The Hospitals/Residents Problem with Ties

  • Robert W. Irving
  • David F. Manlove
  • Sandy Scott
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1851)


The hospitals/residents problem is an extensively-studied many-one stable matching problem. Here, we consider the hospitals/ residents problem where ties are allowed in the preference lists. In this extended setting, a number of natural definitions for a stable matching arise. We present the first linear-time algorithm for the problem under the strongest of these criteria, so-called superstability. Our new results have applications to large-scale matching schemes, such as the National Resident Matching Program in the US, and similar schemes elsewhere.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert W. Irving
    • 1
  • David F. Manlove
    • 1
  • Sandy Scott
    • 2
  1. 1.Dept. of Computing ScienceUniversity of GlasgowScotland
  2. 2.Dept. of MathematicsUniversity of GlasgowScotland

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