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Soundness in the Public-Key Model

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS,volume 2139)

Abstract

The public-key model for interactive proofs has proved to be quite effective in improving protocol efficiency [CGGM00]. We argue, however, that its soundness notion is more subtle and complex than in the classical model, and that it should be better understood to avoid designing erroneous protocols. Specifically, for the public-key model, we

  • identify four meaningful notions of soundness;

  • prove that, under minimal complexity assumptions, these four notions are distinct;

  • identify the exact soundness notions satisfied by prior interactive protocols; and

  • identify the round complexity of some of the new notions.

Keywords

  • Encryption Scheme
  • Security Parameter
  • Random String
  • Interactive Proof
  • Parallel Repetition

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Micali, S., Reyzin, L. (2001). Soundness in the Public-Key Model. In: Kilian, J. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO 2001. CRYPTO 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2139. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44647-8_32

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44647-8_32

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-42456-7

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